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Toxic Causation
Daniel A. Farber*
Since 1970, legal attention to the risks created by toxic sub-
stances has increased dramatically.1 Congress has passed nu-
merous regulatory statutes aimed at preventing future
problems or cleaning up current hazards.2 In the meantime,
courts have been faced with an increasing number of tort ac-
tions seeking damages for injuries allegedly caused by toxic
substances.3 These cases have presented the legal system with
a wide range of novel issues,4 and have sometimes strained the
system to its limits.5 One of the most intriguing of these toxic
* Professor of Law, University of Minnesota. I would like to thank
Professors Roger Findley, Philip Frickey, John Matheson, Donald Marshall,
and Judge Richard Posner for their helpful comments.
1. For discussions of the scope of the toxics problem, see COUNCIL ON EN-
ViRONMENTAL QUALrrY, ENViRONMENTAL QuALITY-1980: THE ELEVENTH AN-
NUAL REPORT 190-214 (1980); Note, Proving Causation in Toxic Torts
Litigation, 11 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1299, 1301 (1983).
2. For a list of the relevant federal statutes, see Note, Tort Actions for
Cancer: Deterrence, Compensation, and Environmental Carcinogenesis, 90
YALE L.J. 840, 841 n.6 (1981). Materials relating to these statutes are collected
in R. FINDLEY & D. FARBER, ENVIRONMENTAL LAw: CASES AND MATERIALS
431-542 (2d ed. 1985).
3. For citations to many of these cases, see infra notes 65-79.
4. These issues are surveyed in Grad, Remedies for Injuries Caused by
Hazardous Waste: The Report and Recommendations of the Superfund 301(e)
Study Group, 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,105 (1984); Prince, Compen-
sation for Victims of Hazardous Substance Exposure, 11 WM. MITCHELL L.
REv. 657 (1985); Developments in the Law-Toxic Waste Litigation, 99 HARv.
L. REV. 1458, 1573-1631 (1986) [hereinafter Developments]. A useful summary
from the litigator's point of view can be found in PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE,
PUB. No. 295, PREPARATION AND TRIAL OF A COMPLEx TOxIC CHEMCAL OR
HAZARDOUS WASTE CASE (S. Birnbaum ed. 1985).
5. See Rabin, Environmental Liability and the Tort System, 24 HOUS. L.
REV. 27, 32 (1987) ("mass accident torts ... put the flexibility of the tort sys-
tem to the test... [b]ut they pose nothing like the challenge of unconfined
liability intrinsic to many environmental harms"). The asbestos cases, for ex-
ample, involve personal injury claims estimated at $30 to $40 billion over the
next 30 years; approximately 20,000 suits are now pending. See Rosenberg,
Book Review, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1693, 1693 (1986) (reviewing P. BRODEUR, OUT-
RAGEOUS MISCONDUCT. THE ASBESTOS INDUSTRY ON TRIAL (1985)). For back-
ground on the asbestos litigation, see Special Project, An Analysis of the Lega
Socia and Political Issues Raised by Asbestos Litigation, 36 VAND. L. REV. 573
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tort issues involves causation. Proof that a toxic substance is
harmful often involves evidence on the frontiers of science.6 In
many cases, the most that can be said is that exposure to a sub-
stance increased the risk that the plaintiff would contract a dis-
ease. Epidemiological evidence often can indicate only the
probability that the plaintiff's injury was caused by the defend-
ant.7 The difficult problem of how to handle these cases has
given rise to extensive scholarly debate.8
At present, something of a scholarly consensus exists in
favor of making recoveries proportional to the probability of
causation.9 For instance, if there was a thirty percent likeli-
(1983). The "mass tort" aspect of the asbestos litigation and other similar cases
raises important issues about bankruptcy law, class actions, insurance law, and
the ability of the judicial system to cope with mass disasters. See, e.g., A.H.
Robins Co. v. Piccinin, 788 F.2d 994, 998-1009 (8th Cir. 1986) (evaluating the
effect of granting a preliminary injunction or stay of suits in other courts in-
volving codefendants of the debtor upon the bankruptcy petition by the manu-
facturer of the Dalkon Shield). For discussion of these issues, which are
outside the scope of this Article, see K. ABRAHAM, INDIvIDuAL ACTION AND
COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY: THE DILEMMA OF MASS TORT REFORM (Univ. of
Va. School of Law, Legal Studies Workshop, Working Paper No. 6); Roe,
Bankruptcy and Mass Tor 84 COLuM. L REv. 846 (1984).
6. See McGarity, Substantive and Procedural Discretion in Administra-
tive Resolution of Science Policy Questions: Regulating Carcinogens in EPA
and OSHA, 67 GEO. L.J. 729, 732-47 (1979). For an introduction to the relevant
methodology, see Lave, Methods of Risk Assessmen4 in QUANTITATIVE RISK
ASSESSMENT IN REGULATION 23-54 (L. Lave ed. 1982). See also sources cited in-
fra note 7.
7. See Prince, supra note 4, at 690. For introductions to epidemiology
and its use in toxic tort litigation, see Black & Lilienfeld, Epidemiologic Proof
in Toxic Tort Litigation, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 732 (1984); Dore, A Commen-
tary on the Use of Epidemiological Evidence in Demonstrating Cause-in-Fact
7 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 429 (1983); Hall & Silbergard, Reappraising Epidemi.
ology: A Response to Mr. Dore, 7 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 441, 441-43 (1983)
(stating that epidemiological studies reveal correlations between disease and
exposure to a toxin). For general introductions to epidemiology, see G. FRIED-
MAN, PRIMER OF EPIDEMIOLOGY (1974); Glass, New Prospectsfor Epidemiologic
Investigations, 234 SCIENCE 951 (1986) (discussing recent developments).
8. See, e.g., Elliott, Why Courts? Comment on Robinson, 14 J. LEGAL
STUD. 799 (1985); Mashaw, A Comment on Causation, Law Reform, and Gue.
rilla Warfare, 73 GEo. L.J. 1393 (1985); Robinson, Probabilistic Causation and
Compensation for Tortious Risk, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 779 (1985); Rosenberg, The
Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A "Public Law" Vision of the
Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REV. 849 (1984); Stewart, The Role of the Courts in
Risk Management 16 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,208 (1986); Develop-
ments, supra note 4, at 1618-24, 1634-53; Note, Allocating the Costs of Hazard-
ous Waste Disposal 94 HARV. L. REV. 584 (1981).
9. See, e.g., K. ABRAHAM, supra note 5, at 57-60 (advocating use of a fund
to compensate individuals on a probabilistic basis); Delgado, Beyond Sindell
Relation of Cause-In-Fact Rules for Indeterminate Plaintiffs, 70 CALIF. L.
REV. 881, 899-902 (1982) (proposing that recoveries be shared pro rata among
1220 [Vol. 71:1219
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hood that the defendant caused the plaintiff's cancer, the plain-
tiff would receive thirty percent of his total damages.' 0
Proportional recovery spreads compensation over all possible
victims, fully compensating no one but paying something even
on the weakest claims.
This Article argues that proportional recovery is valid only
under limited circumstances. It proposes a new theory (called
the MLV or "most likely victim" approach) that is generally
more appropriate. Under MLV, those plaintiffs whose injuries
were least likely to have been caused by the defendant receive
nothing, while those with the highest causation probabilities get
full compensation." MLV has the advantage of focusing com-
pensation on those who were most clearly injured by the de-
fendant, while denying compensation to those whose claims are
the most speculative.' 2 Even where MLV is not directly appli-
cable, the theory illuminates the proper handling of other vari-
eties of toxic tort cases.13
Part I of this Article lays the groundwork for discussion of
the MLV theory. After a brief survey of toxic tort law, Part I
analyzes the leading judicial opinions on toxic causation. Part
II turns to the scholarly literature on causation in toxic tort liti-
gation and discusses the MLV approach. Finally, in Part III, a
taxonomy of toxic causation issues is presented. The rich diver-
sity of toxics cases precludes any one formula from resolving
victims); Landes & Posner, Tort Law as a Regulatory Regime for Catastrophic
Personal Injuries, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 417, 425-31 (1984) (describing a system in
which victims are compensated for actual damages discounted by the
probability of occurrence); Robinson, Multiple Causation in Tort Law: Reflec-
tions on the DES Cases, 68 VA. L. REV. 713, 759-60 (1982) (suggesting a proba-
bilistic approach); Rosenberg, supra note 8, at 881-87 (proposing that courts
determine causation under a proportionality rule); Developments, supra note
4, at 1619-24 (advocating a system of proportional recovery). See also Note, In-
creased Risk of Harm: A New Standard for SufJiciency of Evidence of Causa-
tion in Medical Malpractice, 65 B.U.L. REv. 275, 306 (1985) (presenting a
similar proposal to resolve uncertainties about causation in malpractice cases).
10. For a similar approach to evaluating tort claims for damages covering
future consequences, see King, Causation, Valuation, and Chance in Personal
Injury Torts Involving Preexisting Conditions and Future Consequences, 90
YALE L.J. 1353, 1377-81 (1981) (advocating a move beyond the "all-or-nothing"
approach).
11. See infra text accompanying notes 107-25.
12. MLV maximizes the probability that compensation will be given to
those who were actually injured. Thus, if we wish to compensate the actual
victims of toxic substances, MLV identifies those most deserving of
compensation.
13. See infra text accompanying notes 127-36 ("signature disease" and "no
causation" cases) & 152-59 (clinical proof cases).
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all causation problems. Nevertheless, MLV theory is helpful in
understanding a broad range of cases.
I. THE EMERGING LAW OF TOXIC CAUSATION
Understanding the causation issue requires some back-
ground. This issue arises in the context of toxic tort litigation,
which in itself is a new and rapidly changing field. Courts have
had more occasion to think about causation in the related field
of toxics regulation.14 In the last few years, however, a sub-
stantial number of toxic tort opinions have come out of the
lower federal courts. These opinions are useful not only be-
cause of what they may indicate about the direction of legal de-
velopment, but also because they illuminate the diverse factual
settings in which the toxic causation issue arises.
A. Toxic TORTS IN A NUTSHELL
The plaintiff's first problem is to establish that the defend-
ant's conduct met the requisite liability standard. Although
many toxic tort plaintiffs have brought actions under products
liability theories holding manufacturers strictly liable for defec-
tive products,15 the liability standard is less clear in cases not
involving manufacturers.16 The generally accepted liability test
14. See supra notes 2-4 and accompanying text.
15. See, e.g., School Dist. of Lancaster v. Lake Asbestos of Quebec, Ltd.,
789 F.2d 996, 999 (3d Cir. 1986) (claims brought under various theories includ-
ing strict liability against asbestos producers); In re Diamond Shamrock
Chems. Co., 725 F.2d 858, 859 (2d Cir. 1984) (plaintiffs' theories against produ-
cers of Agent Orange included strict liability, negligence, breach of implied
warranty, intentional tort, and nuisance); Indiana Harbor Belt R.R. v. Ameri-
can Cyanamid Co., 517 F. Supp. 314, 315 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (actions brought under
negligence and strict liability theories for spillage of toxic substances); Cities
Serv. Co. v. Florida, 312 So. 2d 799, 801 (Fla. 1975) (imposing strict liability on
defendant for toxic accident). See also Special Project, supra note 5, at 582
n.23 (stating that most claims against asbestos manufacturers are brought
under a theory of strict liability).
Peter Huber, a Washington, D.C. attorney, argues forcefully that courts
are insufficiently aware of the possible benefits of new technology and are
consequently prone to impose excessive liability. See Huber, Safety and the
Second Best: The Hazards of Public Risk Management in the Courts, 85
COLUm. L. REV. 277, 305-29 (1985). But see Stewart, Regulation, Innovation,
and Administrative Law: A Conceptual Framework, 69 CALIF. L. REv. 1256,
1364-77 (1981) (stating that regulatory agencies and courts consider economic
and social consequences as well as risks of new technologies). As noted ear-
lier, however, this Article is concerned only with the substantive standard for
compensation, not with what forum is most appropriate.
16. For general discussions of the liability issue, see Developments, supra
note 4, at 1610-17; Comment, Pesticide Torts: Oregon Law on Injuries Caused
1222 [Vol. 71:1219
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for hazardous waste releases is stated in the Second Restate-
ment of Torts. Under this test, liability exists despite the exer-
cise of due care if an activity was "abnormally dangerous." To
determine whether an activity is abnormally dangerous, a court
must weigh the probability and severity of foreseeable harm,
whether the activity is unusual or is in an inappropriate loca-
tion, and other factors. 17 Thus, fault plays a role in the Re-
statement assessment.' 8 A few courts have rejected this fault
element, however, and have begun to move beyond the abnor-
by Aerial Spraying of Pesticides, 64 OR. L. REV. 513 (1986). The discussion in
the text relates to common-law liability. Some state statutes impose strict lia-
bility for injuries due to hazardous waste releases. See Comment, State Haz-
ardous Waste Superfunds and CERCLA. Conflict or Complement?, 13 Envtl.
L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,348, 10,355 (1983) (states imposing strict liability in-
clude Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, New Hampshire, and New
Jersey).
17. According to the Second Restatement, the following factors are rele-
vant: (a) existence of a high degree of risk of some harm to the person, land
or chattels of others; (b) likelihood that the harm that results from [the activ-
ity] will be great; (c) inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of reason-
able care; (d) extent to which the activity is not a matter of common usage;
(e) inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it is carried on; and
(f) extent to which its value to the community is outweighed by its dangerous
attributes. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 (1977).
18. See SUPERFUND SECTION 301(E) STUDy GROUP, 97TH CONG., 2D SESS.,
INJURIES AND DAMAGES FROM HAZARDOUS WASTES-ANALYSiS AND IMPROVE-
MENT OF LEGAL REMEDIES, A REPORT TO CONGRESS IN COMPLIANCE WITH SEC-
TION 301(E) OF THE COMPREHENSIVE ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSE,
COMPENSATION, AND LIABILITY ACT OF 1980, 273 (Comm. Print 1982) [hereinaf-
ter SUPERFUND REPORT] (whenever a balancing of factors is required under a
strict liability theory, as in the Restatement, fault is easily implied). Further-
more, liability must be determined on a case-by-case basis. Id. at 272. The offi-
cial commentary to the Restatement says that "[b]ecause of the interplay of
these various factors, it is not possible to reduce abnormally dangerous activi-
ties to any definition." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 comment f
(1977). For instance, as the commentary to the Restatement makes clear, stor-
ing high explosives may or may not be an abnormally dangerous use, depend-
ing on the location. Id § 520 comments g & j. As the Superfumd Section
301(e) Study Group said:
[These tests] consider the place where the activity is carried on, or
consider alternatives to the activity. Such considerations permit no-
tions of fault to get in by the back door, because the choice of place,
the question of appropriateness of the activity to a particular place, or
choices in the manner of conducting the activity invariably import no-
tions of duty of care, responsibility and fault. This, in turn, places the
heavy burden of proof back on the plaintiff.
SUPERFUND REPORT, supra, at 278. This test differs in some relatively minor
ways from alternative tests used by some courts, such as the test adopted by
the first Restatement. See SUPERFUND REPORT, supra, at 273 (the balancing
emphasis of the Restatement (Second) of Tort's test is theoretically different
from the initial Restatement test); PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 78, at
551-52 (5th ed. 1984) (stating that courts adopt Rylands v. Fletcher, as had the
1223
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mally dangerous test.19 In State v. Ventron Corp.,20 the New
Jersey Supreme Court imposed strict liability for harm caused
by toxic substances escaping from a landowner's property.21
Restatement of Torts, in all essential respects "under the cloak of various
other theories").
19. The argument in favor of strict liability is made in Developments,
supra note 4, at 1610-17.
20. 94 N.J. 473, 468 A.2d 150 (1983).
21. See id. at 491, 468 A.2d at 159-60. More recently, in an action against a
township, a lower court rejected claims for damages based on emotional dis-
tress and enhanced risk of cancer. Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 189 N.J.
Super. 561, 568-72, 461 A.2d 184, 188-90 (Law Div. 1983), affid as modified, 202
N.J. Super. 106, 493 A.2d 1314 (App. Div.), petition and cross-petition for certi-
fication granted, 102 N.J. 306, 508 A.2d 191 (1985). In another recent decision,
the court held that privately owned waste generators were strictly liable for
injuries caused by releases, but that waste haulers, public dump owners, and
state regulators were not. Kenney v. Scientific, Inc., 204 N.J. Super. 228, 263-
64, 497 A.2d 1310, 1328-29 (Law Div. 1985). Commentators believe that the
New Jersey Supreme Court's ultimate decisions in these cases will have na-
tional impact. See Comment, Hazardous Waste and the Common Law: Will
New Jersey Clear the Way for Victims to Recover, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L.
Inst.) 10,321, 10,324 (1985). The economic literature on standards of liability is
discussed in Ulen, Hester & Johnson, Minnesota's Environmental Response
and Liability Act. An Economic Justification, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L.
Inst.) 10,109, 10,111-12 (1985) (arguing for strict liability).
When a reasonable medical expert would advise increased surveillance be-
cause of exposure, it is hard to see why the firm causing this expense should
not be liable, even if the additional risk cannot be quantified. See Ayers, 189
N.J. Super. at 572-73, 461 A.2d at 190; Askey v. Occidental Chem. Corp., 102
A.D.2d 130, 135, 477 N.Y.S.2d 242, 246 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984). See generally
Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 727 F.2d 506, 522 (5th Cir. 1984) (Jack-
son 1) (stating that courts can establish the "reasonable necessity and expense
of future medical examinations"), affd in par4 rev'd in par 750 F.2d 1314
(5th Cir. 1985) (en banc) (Jackson I1), affid on reh'g, 781 F.2d 394 (5th Cir.) (en
banc) (Jackson III), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 3339 (1986). Since the purpose is to
finance a means of limiting future injury, this remedy can be considered pre-
ventive rather than compensatory.
On the other hand, to allow damages for emotional distress caused by fear
of possible future injuries, as one commentator has suggested, could expose
companies to unforeseeable and potentially crippling liability even when it was
ultimately determined that their conduct had not caused any tangible harm.
Bohrer, Fear and Trembling in the Twentieth Century: Technological Risk,
Uncertainty and Emotional Distress, 1984 WIs. L. REV. 83, 99. Nevertheless,
in an asbestos case, the Fifth Circuit upheld an award of damages for the
plaintiff's fear of getting cancer, although the court concluded that there was
no proof of a "medical probability" that he actually would get cancer. Dartez
v. Fibreboard Corp., 765 F.2d 456, 467 (5th Cir. 1985). See also Jackson III, 781
F.2d at 413-15 (upholding damages for fear of cancer where plaintiff already
had asbestosis and had greater than 50% chance of getting cancer); Anderson
v. Welding Testing Lab., Inc., 304 So. 2d 351, 353 (La. 1974) (fear of cancer
from radiation burns was compensable although the actual risk might be mini-
mal). But see Payton v. Abbott Labs, 386 Mass. 540, 544-47, 437 N.E.2d 171,
174-76 (1982) (rejecting emotional distress damages in a DES case). Another
1224 [Vol. 71:1219
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Even if the defendant's conduct meets the requisite legal
standard for liability, several possible barriers may prevent re-
covery. Statutes of limitations can create major difficulties in
some states. For example, a New York trial judge in 1983 dis-
missed fifty-four of ninety-one personal injury actions by resi-
dents of Love Canal. The judge held that the actions were
barred by New York's statute of limitations because they were
filed more than three years after exposure to the toxic chemi-
cals.22 The statute of limitations problem has also received
great attention in the asbestos cases.
23
Another problem is establishing a link between the defend-
ant and the release of the substance. For example, many haz-
ardous waste generators may have shipped similar materials to
the site in question. It may be quite difficult to establish whose
containers leaked or in what quantities.24 A similar issue can
arise in products liability cases.25 In Sindell v. Abbott Laborato-
ries,26 the plaintiff's mother was administered the drug diethyl-
stilbesterol (DES) during pregnancy.2 7 Although DES was
routinely given to prevent miscarriage, it is now known to
cause a rare form of cancer in some daughters of women who
took the drug.28 After developing such cancer, the plaintiff
damages issue that will not be discussed here is the availability of punitive
damages. See Jackson III, 781 F.2d at 398-409; Jackson I, 727 F.2d at 524-30;
Fischer v. Johns-Manville Corp., 103 N.J. 643, 512 A.2d 466 (1986).
22. The other 37 plaintiffs were able to show that they were exposed
within three years of filing their suits. Abram v. Occidental Chem. Corp., 14
Env't Rep. (BNA) 385, 386 (July 8, 1983) (summarizing this unreported deci-
sion). For extensive background in the cases, see A. LEVINE, LOVE CANAL:
SCIENCE, PoLrTcs, AND PEOPLE (1982).
23. See, e.g., Jackson I, 727 F.2d at 517-20; Wilson v. Johns-Manville Sales
Corp., 684 F.2d 111 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Steinhardt v. Johns-Manville Corp., 54
N.Y.2d 1008, 430 N.E.2d 1297, 446 N.Y.S.2d 244 (1981), cert. denied 456 U.S. 967
(1982).
A related problem is the ability of a plaintiff to recover immediately for
some tangible injury, without fear that the defendant will be able to plead res
judicata if the plaintiff later develops a more serious illness such as cancer.
See, e.g., Jackson I, 727 F.2d at 521 ("justice required" that subsequent claims
be allowed for distinct diseases). For a general discussion of the statute of lim-
itations issue in hazardous waste cases, see Developments, supra note 4, at
1604-16.
24. This issue is discussed in Developments, supra note 4, at 1624-25; Note,
supra note 1, at 1315-25.
25. For an insightful discussion, see Robinson, supra note 9, at 718-28
(comparing causation issues in toxic tort litigation to DES issues).
26. 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, cert denied, 449 U.S.
912 (1980).
27. Id. at 593, 607 P.2d at 925, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 133.
28. See infra notes 132-33 and accompanying text.
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sued eleven of the more than two hundred manufacturers of
DES.29 Although the plaintiff was unable to identify the manu-
facturer of the particular DES which her mother took, the
court held that she had stated a cause of action against manu-
facturers of the drug using an identical formula.30 Resting this
holding on a broad social policy, the court noted that the de-
fendants were "better able to bear the cost of injury resulting
from the manufacture of a defective product."31 The Sindell
court then adopted a novel theory of liability by making each
defendant liable for a share of the plaintiff's damages, based on
its share of the DES market.32 Assuming that the Sindell the-
ory or one of its variants becomes the norm in products liability
litigation,33 it could be readily adapted to hazardous waste
litigation.
B. THE CAUSATION PROBLEM
Sindell and related theories address the problem of linking
the defendant to the chemical exposure. An even more diffi-
cult problem is that of linking the exposure to the plaintiff's
injury. It is a commonplace that toxic chemical regulation in-
volves matters at the boundaries of scientific knowledge.34 This
29. Sindel4 26 Cal. 3d at 593, 602-03, 607 P.2d at 925, 935, 163 Cal. Rptr. at
133, 143.
30. Id. at 610-13, 607 P.2d at 936-38, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144-46.
31. Id. at 611, 607 P.2d at 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144.
32. Id. at 611-12, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145.
33. For recent cases addressing the Sindell doctrine, see H. Blackston v.
Shook & Fletcher Insulation Co., 764 F.2d 1480, 1483 (11th Cir. 1985); Copeland
v. Celotex Corp., 447 So. 2d 908, 914-15 (Fla. App. 1984), quashed, 471 So. 2d 533
(1985); Payton v. Abbott Labs, 386 Mass. 540, 572, 437 N.E.2d 171, 189 (1982);
Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co., 418 Mich. 311, 336-37, 343 N.W.2d 164, 175-76, cert. de-
nied, 469 U.S. 833 (1984); Namm v. Charles E. Frosst & Co., 178 N.J. Super. 19,
28, 427 A.2d 1121, 1125 (App. Div. 1981); Ferrigno v. Eli Lilly Co., 175 N.J.
Super. 551, 573, 420 A.2d 1305, 1316 (Law Div. 1980); Collins v. Eli Lilly Co.,
116 Wis. 2d 166, 188-90, 342 N.W.2d 37, 48-49, cert denied, 469 U.S. 826 (1984).
A good review of the cases can be found in Judge Weinstein's opinion in In re
"Agent Orange" Prods. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740, 819-28 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
Generally, courts have been most willing to apply the doctrine when all the
potential defendants were before the court. Id. at 826. For incisive commen-
tary on Sindell, see Epstein, Two Fallacies in the Law of Joint Torts, 73 GEO.
L.J. 1377, 1378-82 (1985) (stating that the market-share solution is unwork-
able); Wright, Causation in Tort Law, 73 CALIF. L. REv. 1735, 1819-21 (1985)
(stating that the market-share approach overcharges joined defendants).
34. See Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst.,
448 U.S. 607, 610 (1980); Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 6-7 (D.C. Cir.) (en
banc), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976); Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA, 514 F.2d
492, 513 (8th Cir. 1975); see also McGarity, supra note 6, at 736-47 (varying sci-
entific interpretations and inferences make formal rulemaking inadvisable);
1226 [Vol. 71:1219
TOXIC CA USATION
scientific uncertainty causes severe problems for government
regulators,35 but even more serious problems result for private
plaintiffs who must establish a defendant's liability by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence.
36
In considering compensation, it is important to keep in
mind that there are really two causation problems. One is the
problem of establishing that the chemical involved is capable of
causing the type of harm from which the plaintiff suffers.37
This is often difficult because the causation of diseases like can-
cer is so poorly understood.3 8 For this reason, medical theory is
Page, A Generic View of Toxic Chemicals and Similar Risks, 7 ECOLOGY L.Q.
207, 208 (1978) (ignorance of the mechanism is a prime characteristic of an en-
vironmental risk); Ruckelshaus, Risk in a Free Society, 14 Envtl. L. Rep.
(Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,190, 10,191 (1984) (assessment of risks is difficult without a
factual basis).
35. See, e.g., Doniger, Federal Regulation of Vinyl Chloride: A Short
Course in the Law and Policy of Toxic Substances Control, 7 ECOLOGY L.Q.
500, 508-22 (1978); Latin, The Feasibility of Occupational Health Standards:
An Essay on Legal Decisionmaking Under Uncertainty, 78 Nw. U.L. REV. 583,
587-600 (1983).
36. See Causation and Financial Compensation, 73 GEO. L.J. 1357 (1985);
Delgado, supra note 9; Note, supra note 1.
37. Scientists apparently are much more doubtful now than they were a
few years ago that nonoccupational chemical exposure (apart from tobacco) is
a significant cause of cancer. See M. DOUGLAS & A. WILDAVSKY, RISK AND
CULTURE: AN ESSAY ON THE SELECTION OF TECHNIcAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL
DANGERS 49-66 (1982) (stating that scientists themselves disagree over whether
there is a risk, whether the risk is unacceptable, and what are appropriate so-
lutions); R. FINDLEY & D. FARBE, supra note 2, at 378-79 (reporting that man-
made carcinogens may be responsible for less than 8% of cancer deaths);
Ames, Dietary Carcinogens and Anticarcinogens, 221 SCIENCE 1256 (1983)
(stating that dietary intake of natural antioxidants are an important defense
mechanism against disease-causing agents); Grobstein, Saccharin: A Scientist's
View, in THE SCIENTIFIC BASIS OF HEALTH AND SAFETY REGULATION 117, 127
(R. Crandall & L. Lave eds. 1981) (linking cancer to a collection of normal en-
vironmental factors); Huber, supra note 15, at 295-97 (citing a study showing
that the risk of cancer, other than from smoking, is holding steady despite an
influx of chemical and industrial hazards). Similarly, there is now some doubt
about the toxic effects of dioxin. See Tschirley, Dioxin, ScI. Am., Feb. 1986, at
29 (discussing the uncertain effect of chlorinated dioxin on humans). Never-
theless, billions of dollars in dioxin-based claims are now pending. See Riley,
Lawyers Take Aim at Dioxin: A Silver Bullet-Or Merely a Dud?, Nat'l L.J.,
July 23, 1984, at 1, col. 1.
38. The Office of Science and Technology Policy has recently provided an
authoritative, lengthy, and detailed discussion of the techniques used to deter-
mine carcinogenicity and their limitations. See OFFICE OF SCIENCE AND TECH-
NOLOGY POLICY, Chemical Carcinogens; A Review of the Science and Its
Associated Principles, 50 Fed. Reg. 10,371 (1985). See especially id. at 10,377-78
on the limits of epidemiology. A briefer summary can be found in Interdisci-
plinary Panel on Carcinogenicity, Criteria for Evidence of Chemical Carcino-
genicity, 225 SCIENCE 682 (1984). See generally Rouvray, Predicting Chemistry
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relatively unhelpful in filling in gaps in the factual picture.
Facts themselves are hard to come by. Many toxic substances
are relatively novel, and, given the long latency periods associ-
ated with cancer, sufficient evidence concerning health effects
is not likely to be available for the foreseeable future. Animal
studies, although useful, generally involve much higher doses
that are difficult to extrapolate to low doses over prolonged pe-
riods; there is also the question of whether extrapolation of re-
sults between species is valid. Epidemiological studies are also
helpful but often inconclusive regarding the level of risk cre-
ated by a toxic substance.39
The other problem relating to proof of causation is that of
establishing, given that the toxic substance in question can
cause harm of the type suffered by the plaintiff, that the plain-
tiff's harm did in fact result from such exposure. A chemical
may increase the prevalence of a disease enough to leave no
doubt that some members of the exposed population were in-
jured by that chemical. Others, however, may have suffered in-
juries from independent sources, and the two groups may be
impossible to distinguish. The statistical association between
exposure and illness may be too weak to justify a finding that a
particular plaintiff's disease is causally linked to an exposure to
a hazardous substance.
1. Causation in the Regulatory Context
Toxic chemicals are regulated under a number of federal
statutes.40 A recurring problem has been the difficulty of es-
tablishing, given the limits of present scientific knowledge, that
a particular substance is indeed a health hazard and therefore
subject to regulation. 41
The leading case on the problem of scientific uncertainty in
from Tolpology, ScI. AM., Sept. 1986, at 40, 47 (linking carcinogenicity and
structural characteristics of molecules).
39. See Black & Lilienfeld, supra note 7, at 750-64; Dore, supra note 7, at
435-36. Another novel theory, involving even greater problems of proof, postu-
lates a link between exposure to toxic chemicals and damage to the immune
system generally. See Marshall, Woburn Case May Spark Explosion of Law.
suits, 234 SCIENCE 418 (1986).
40. See supra note 2.
41. See Schneiderman, The Uncertain Risks We Run: Hazardous Materi-
als, in SOCIETAL RISK AssEssMEN7. How SAFE IS SAFE ENOUGH? 19 (R. Schw-
ing & W. Albers eds. 1980). For a recent review, see Belsky, Environmental
Policy Law in the 1980's: Shifting Back the Burden of Proof, 12 ECOLOGY L.Q.
1 (1984).
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this context is Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA.4 Reserve Mining
discharged huge amounts of mining byproducts containing as-
bestos into Lake Superior, thereby contaminating Duluth's
drinking water. In considering the question of risk, the Eighth
Circuit was handicapped by a lack of scientific evidence on the
danger of ingesting (as opposed to inhaling) asbestos. The
plaintiffs' only significant evidence was that workers exposed to
asbestos dust suffered from a moderate increase in gastro-intes-
tinal cancer.43 One possible explanation, according to expert
witnesses, was that asbestos workers first inhaled the asbestos
dust and then coughed up and swallowed the asbestos parti-
cles.44 The most the court could conclude was that public expo-
sure to asbestos fibers "gives rise to a reasonable medical
concern for the public health. '45 The court was unable to con-
clude, however, that "the probability of harm is more likely
than not. '46 Nevertheless, given the potential seriousness of
the threat to public health, the Eighth Circuit found the evi-
dence sufficient to justify an order requiring Reserve Mining to
eliminate the discharge expeditiously.47
The Supreme Court's first encounter with the problem of
toxic chemicals was in Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO
v. American Petroleum Institute,48 generally known as the
"benzene case." The case involved an occupational safety regu-
42. 514 F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1975). For further background on the case, see
M. SHAPO, A NATION OF GUINEA PIGS 191-217 (1979). The Reserve Mining ap-
proach to risk was followed in Lead Indus. Ass'n v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130 (D.C.
Cir. 1980); Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc), cert denied,
426 U.S. 941 (1976). See generally McGarity, supra note 6, at 796-808 (examin-
ing the appropriate judicial role in reviewing agency decisions on scientific
issues).
43. The district court had directed a study of the tissues of long-time Du-
luth residents to determine whether asbestos fibers were present. Reserve
Mining Co., 514 F.2d at 514. The plaintiffs' principal medical witness had testi-
fied that the study should disclose the presence of asbestos if orally ingested
asbestos is absorbed by the body. Id. Nevertheless, the study failed to indicate
that Duluth residents had any greater amounts of asbestos in their tissues
than residents of Houston, where the water is free of asbestos fibers. Id. at
514-15. Moreover, animal tests intended to determine whether ingested fibers
penetrate into the body were inconclusive. Id. at 515-16.
44. Id. at 516.
45. Id. at 520.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 520, 538-40. On the remedial issue, see Farber, Equitable Discre-
tion, Legal Duties, and Environmental Injunctions, 45 U. PIr. L. REV. 513,
531-35 (1984).
48. 448 U.S. 607 (1980) ("these are unusually important cases of first im-
pression," id, at 615.).
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lation governing benzene, a carcinogen for which a safe level of
exposure is not known to exist. The Secretary of Labor had set
the permissible exposure level for workers at one part per mil-
lion (ppm), which he considered the lowest economically feasi-
ble level that industries could achieve. 49 The primary opinion
was written by Justice Stevens and was joined in its entirety by
only two other Justices.50 According to the plurality opinion,
the Secretary must make a threshold finding of a "significant
risk of harm" before issuing any regulation.51 The plurality
went to some lengths to rebut the dissent's charge that this ap-
proach would prevent effective regulation until deaths had ac-
tually occurred. First, the plurality stated that what constitutes
a "significant" risk was a judgment for the agency to make and
plainly involved policy considerations.52 Second, the plurality
noted that the agency's findings need not be supported by "any-
thing approaching scientific certainty. '53 Thus, the plurality
concluded that "so long as they are supported by a body of rep-
utable scientific thought, the Agency is free to use conservative
assumptions in interpreting the data with respect to carcino-
gens, risking error on the side of overprotection rather than
49. Id. at 613. The Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA) estimated the total cost of compliance as including $266 million in
capital investments, $187 to $205 million in first-year start-up costs, and $34
million in annual costs. Id at 628-29. About 35,000 employees were affected
by the regulation. Id. at 629. The Fifth Circuit had struck down the regulation
on the theory that the statute implicitly required a cost-benefit analysis by the
agency. Id. at 614. On review, only one member of the Supreme Court, Jus-
tice Powell, reached this issue, see id. at 667-71 (Powell, J., concurring). An-
other member of the Court, Justice Rehnquist, concurred in the judgment but
based his opinion on his finding that the statute was an unconstitutional dele-
gation of legislative power, id at 671-88 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). The Court
as a whole divided four to four on the issue whether the standards set were
based on adequate findings in the administrative record.
50. Chief Justice Burger and Justice Stewart joined the primary opinion
in its entirety. Id. at 611. Justice Powell also joined parts of the opinion. Id
at 664 (Powell, J., concurring).
51. Id at 642. After close examination of the record, the plurality ob-
served that the industry had argued that the regulation would save at most
two lives every six years. Id at 654. According to the plurality, a risk of one
in a billion is clearly insignificant, but a risk of one in a thousand "might well"
be considered significant. Id. at 655. The Court declined to determine whether
the risk level alleged by industry would be considered significant because
OSHA itself had made no finding on this issue, which the plurality thought to
be a critical requirement of the Act. Id. at 655.
52. Id
53. Id. at 656.
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underprotection."'5 4
The benzene case clearly leaves the law in some confu-
sion.s5 Only four members of the Court believed that a "signifi-
54. Id. Chief Justice Burger stressed the limitations of the plurality
opinion:
Our holding that the Secretary must retrace his steps with greater
care and consideration is not to be taken in derogation of the scope of
legitimate agency discretion. When the facts and arguments have
been presented and duly considered, the Secretary must make a pol-
icy judgment as to whether a specific risk of health impairment is sig-
nificant in terms of the policy objectives of the statute. When he acts
in this capacity, pursuant to the legislative authority delegated by
Congress, he exercises the prerogatives of the legislature-to focus on
only one aspect of a larger problem, or to promulgate regulations that,
to some, may appear as imprudent policy or inefficient allocation of
resources. The judicial function does not extend to substantive revi-
sion of regulatory policy.
I& at 663 (Burger, C.J., concurring). The Chief Justice noted, however, that
"[p]erfect safety is a chimera; regulation must not strangle human activity in
the search for the impossible." Id- at 664.
55. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court's only other decision in this area
does little to clarify this issue. American Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan,
452 U.S. 490 (1981), involved a standard regulating cotton dust, which causes a
disease called byssinosis (more commonly known as "brown lung" disease).
The benzene case is discussed only in a footnote in American Textile Mfrs.
Inst., Inc. See id. at 505 n.25. OSHA had "expressly found that 'exposure to
cotton dust presents a significant health hazard to employees' "; indeed, 25% of
all employees in the industry suffered at least low-grade byssinosis. Id& at 506
n.25 (quoting 43 Fed. Reg. 27,350 (1978)). As the Court said, "It is difficult to
imagine what else the agency could do to comply with this Court's decision in
[the benzene case]." Id
The primary issue before the Supreme Court was whether the agency had
to conduct a cost-benefit analysis before issuing its regulation. In an opinion
by Justice Brennan, the Court held that a cost-benefit analysis was not neces-
sary. Id. at 512-13. According to the Court, all that is necessary is a feasibility
analysis, that is, an analysis showing that performance is economically possible
but not an analysis comparing the cost of compliance with the benefits of the
regulation. Id at 508-12.
The implications of these OSHA decisions for toxic regulation in general
remain unclear. The four dissenters in the benzene case have clearly endorsed
the approach taken by lower courts in cases like Reserve Mining Co. See
supra notes 42-47. The members of the plurality in the benzene case have
taken a more cautious view, but apparently are not willing to reject squarely
the prevailing approach in the lower courts. One member of the Court, Chief
Justice Rehnquist, has never spoken to the merits of any of these issues, while
Justices O'Connor and Scalia were not present for the decision of either case.
Thus, we can only speculate about the Court's future direction. Certainly,
however, it would be an exaggeration to see the Supreme Court opinions as a
repudiation of the doctrines developed by the lower courts in this area. For a
useful, recent judicial opinion, see Public Citizen Health Research Group v.
Tyson, 796 F.2d 1479 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (reviewing OSHA's rule limiting expo-
sure to ethylene oxide). For further discussion, see Latin, The "Signifiwance"
of Toxic Health Risks: An Essay on Legal Decisionmaking Under Uncer-
tainty, 10 ECOLOGY L.Q. 339 (1982) (addressing the question of how courts
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cant risk" finding was required by the Occupational Safety and
Health Act. Four members disagreed and a fifth member be-
lieved that the statute was completely silent on the problem.56
Even the Stevens plurality opinion, however, gave the agency
substantial leeway in dealing with scientific uncertainty.
The courts' relatively liberal attitude toward proof of harm
in the regulatory context might appear to argue strongly for a
similar attitude in the compensation context. In the regulatory
cases, however, the issue is one of prevention. If society can
prevent possible injuries in the future by taking sensible pre-
ventive action today, clearly society ought to do so even if no
one can be sure that any injuries would otherwise occur. Wear-
ing a seat belt makes sense even though you do not know in ad-
vance that you will ever be in an accident. Moreover,
prevention does not require that the particular victims be iden-
tified. Compensation is a different matter. We do not impose
liability on a driver who might have been involved in a car
crash but who was more likely in a different city on the day of
the accident. Prevention is always linked to the possibility of a
future accident. Compensation, although serving some deter-
rent purpose, is primarily based on the existence of a past acci-
dent.5 7 Thus, the regulatory cases have only limited relevance
should respond to factual uncertainty resulting from the absence of reasonable
scientific consensus in fields of environmental protection, public health and
safety).
56. The decisive fifth vote was cast by Justice Rehnquist, who reached his
decision on constitutional grounds. Justice Rehnquist argued that the statute
was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority to the agency. See
Industrial Union Dep% AFL-CIO, 448 U.S. at 672, 675 (Rehnquist, J., concur-
ring). This view is somewhat out of line with the Supreme Court's decisions
over the last half century. Not since the Court's unsuccessful attempt to block
the New Deal has the Court struck down a statute on this basis.
Justice Marshall wrote a stinging dissent, joined by Justices Brennan,
White, and Blackmun. Justice Marshall found it incredible that the plurality
could read any substantive meaning into the statutory definition of a health
standard as one "reasonably necessary" to provide safe employment. Id at
708-13 (Marshall, J., dissenting). In his view, the meaning of the statute was
clear: in dealing with any toxic chemical, the Secretary was to set a standard
which would ensure (to the extent feasible) that no risk would be presented to
any employee. See id, at 689-90. Justice Marshall's view does seem to give the
most natural reading to the statutory language. See 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5)
(1982) ("The Secretary... shall set the standard which most adequately en-
sures, to the extent feasible.., that no employee will suffer material impair-
ment of health or functional capacity.. .
57. As Judge Weinstein explained:
The distinction between avoidance of risk through regulation and
compensation for injuries after the fact is a fundamental one. In the
former, risk assessments may lead to control of a toxic substance even
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to the compensation problem.
2. Tort Litigation
Despite the novelty of tort litigation over toxic causation,
clear patterns have already evolved in some areas. Swine flu li-
ability is one such area. In 1976, to head off a possible epidemic,
the government implemented a mass immunization program.
Vaccination was later suspended because of an apparent con-
nection between the vaccine and an increase in Guillain-Barr6
Syndrome (GBS). GBS is a rare neurological disease of un-
known origin.58 A study by the Center for Disease Control
(CDC) established the existence of a clearly elevated rate of
GBS immediately following immunization, tapering off over
several months.59 By ten weeks after immunization, according
to CDC, GBS was close to the background rate, that is, the rate
among those who were not vaccinated.60 Through a combina-
tion of government stipulation of liability as to some cases and
litigation over the others, the following compensation rules
emerged:
(1) the government is liable for any case of GBS within
ten weeks of immunization;6 '
(2) the government generally is not liable for any later
cases of GBS;62 and
(3) the government usually is not liable for any other dis-
eases, regardless of proximity to immunization.6 3 Thus, the
though the probability of harm to any individual is small and the
studies necessary to assess the risk are incomplete; society as a whole
is willing to pay the price as a matter of policy. In the latter, a far
higher probability (greater than 50%) is required since the law be-
lieves it unfair to require an individual to pay for another's tragedy
unless it is shown that it is more likely than not that he caused it.
In re "Agent Orange" Prods. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740, 781 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
58. Cook v. United States, 545 F. Supp. 306, 307 (N.D. Cal. 1982).
59. Id- at 308, 317.
60. Id. at 308.
61. See id. at 307 ("the government has stipulated to liability in GBS cases
with an onset of ten weeks or less after vaccination").
62. See id. at 307, 315-16 (finding that the government was not liable when
plaintiffs developed GBS 12-1/2 to 13-1/2 weeks after receiving the vaccine);
Heyman v. United States, 506 F. Supp. 1145, 1150 (S.D. Fla. 1981) (finding the
government not liable when the plaintiff developed GBS 16 weeks after re-
ceiving the swine flu vaccine).
63. See Hasler v. United States, 718 F.2d 202, 205-06 (6th Cir. 1983) (find-
ing the government not liable when plaintiff developed rheumatoid arthritis
10 days after receiving vaccine), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 817 (1984); Kubs v.
United States, 537 F. Supp. 560, 563 (E.D. Wis. 1982) (finding the government
not liable when the only connection between plaintiff's polymyalgia rheumat-
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causation problem in mass exposure cases is not necessarily an
impossible barrier to recovery.64
Litigation about Agent Orange, a defoliant and herbicide
used by American forces in the Vietnam War, has provided the
most extensive judicial discussion of toxic causation.65 Numer-
ous lawsuits were filed against the manufacturers by veterans,
their families, and others who contended that Agent Orange
had caused various illnesses. Ultimately, the litigation was con-
solidated in Judge Weinstein's court in the Eastern District of
New York.66 The weakness of the plaintiffs' causation evi-
dence67 persuaded Judge Weinstein to approve a $180 million
ica and swine flu vaccine was temporal); Tabaczynski v. United States, 529 F.
Supp. 156, 162 (E.D. Mich. 1981) (finding the government not liable when
plaintiff developed polymyocitis one week after receiving the vaccine), affd
without opinion, 711 F.2d 1059 (6th Cir. 1983); Bean v. United States, 533 F.
Supp. 567, 580 (D. Colo. 1980) (despite expert testimony linking swine flu vac-
cine and the plaintiffs dropfoot, the government was found not liable because
the plaintiff did not establish proximate cause). But see Brazzell v. United
States, 788 F.2d 1352, 1360 (8th Cir. 1986) (upholding an award of damages for
myalgia); Manko v. United States, 55 U.S.L.W. 2068 (D. Mo. June 5, 1986) (im-
posing liability for GBS after 10th week). For a general discussion of the
swine flu litigation, see Reitze, Federal Compensation for Vaccination In-
duced Injuries, 13 B.C. ENvTL. AFF. L. REV. 169, 170-88 (1986).
64. See infra notes 127-36 and accompanying text for further examples.
65. See In re "Agent Orange" Prods. IAab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740, 775-95
(E.D.N.Y. 1984). Another very useful judicial opinion is Allen v. United
States, 588 F. Supp. 247, 404-43 (D. Utah 1984) (discussing the question of cau-
sation before holding the government liable for 10 cases of cancer in individu-
als exposed to fallout near a nuclear bomb test site), rev'd, No. 84-2126, slip op.
(10th Cir. Apr. 20, 1987) (holding that the "discretionary exception" in 28
U.S.C. § 2680(a) precludes government liability).
66. The main class action was filed in 1979, and the class was certified in
1980. In re "Agent Orange" Prods. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. at 750, 752. The
size of the class was variously estimated at 600,000 to 2,400,000, of whom 2440
opted out. Id. at 756. More than a thousand members of the class were heard
from concerning the possible settlement. Id. at 764. Notices concerning the
settlement were sent to over 400,000. Id. at 763. Discovery involved more than
200 depositions and "hundreds of thousands of pages of government docu-
ments, many of which were formerly considered classified." Id at 757. The
final settlement involved a payment of $180 million with interest at the rate of
$60,000 per day. Id. at 748. Many of the 4500 lawyers who participated have
filed appeals. See 54 U.S.L.W. 2095 (Aug. 13, 1985). Because of a dispute about
the distribution of the settlement proceeds, the judgment was stayed by the
Second Circuit. N.Y. Times, Aug. 28, 1986, § A, at 1, col. 3. The fund had
grown to $225 million by August, 1986. I&, Aug. 28, 1986, § B, at 12, col. 1. The
settlement approved by Judge Weinstein was upheld by the Second Circuit.
N.Y. Times, Apr. 21, 1987, at 14, col. 4. A three-judge panel of the Second Cir-
cuit handed down nine opinions, all concerning aspects of the Agent Orange
cases, on April 21, 1987. In re "Agent Orange" Prods. LAab. Litig. MDL No.
381, slip ops. (2d Cir. Apr. 21, 1987).
67. See In re 'Agent Orange" Prods. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. at 782. The
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settlement, which was considered highly favorable to the
defendants. 68
As Judge Weinstein explained, the evidence concerning the
possible dangers from Agent Orange would have been enough
for a court to uphold an administrative order limiting its use.69
Emphasizing the distinction between preventive regulatory
measures and compensatory legal actions, however, Judge
Weinstein noted that "[i]n the latter [case], a far higher
probability (greater than 50%) is required since the law be-
lieves it unfair to require an individual to pay for another's
tragedy unless it is shown that it is more likely than not that he
caused it."70 The key flaw in the plaintiffs' case was that gov-
ernment epidemiological studies showed no statistical link be-
tween Agent Orange exposure and significant health effects.
Studies by the Air Force, the CDC, and the Australian govern-
ment all had concluded that no health effects had been demon-
strated.7 1 Hence, Judge Weinstein agreed that a settlement was
in the best interests of the class.
In companion cases, involving opt-outs or individuals never
included in the class, Judge Weinstein was forced to rule on the
merits of the plaintiffs' claims.72 In these cases, he granted
suits also involved extraordinary legal complications. Because of the nation-
wide nature of the class, at least 50 statutes of limitations were potentially ap-
plicable, leaving Judge Weinstein in something of a quandary about the
applicable law. IM at 800-16. Several complex products liability issues were
also involved. I& at 819-42.
68. Id. at 748-49; but see id. at 764-75 ("more than a thousand class mem-
bers" expressed their views on the settlement, largely unfavorably). The set-
tlement was far below even the medical costs of the class, ignoring other
damages. Id. at 762. According to the Second Circuit, the maximum payment
to any single class member would be $12,800. In re "Agent Orange" Prods.
Liab. Litig., 800 F.2d 14, 20 (2d Cir. 1986). The unusual settlement process is
discussed in detail in Shuck, The Role of Judges in Settling Complex Cases:
The Agent Orange Example, 53 U. Cm. L. REv. 337 (1986).
69. In re "Agent Orange" Prods. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. at 785.
70. Id at 781.
71. Id at 787-94.
72. See Lilley v. Dow Chem. Co. (In re "Agent Orange" Prods. Liab. Li-
tig.), 611 F. Supp. 1267 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (granting summary judgment against
the wife of a Vietnam veteran who had opted out of class); Hogan v. Dow
Chem. Co. (In re "Agent Orange" Prods. Liab. Litig.), 611 F. Supp. 1290
(E.D.N.Y. 1985) (civilian claim dismissed on defendants' summary judgment
motion); Fraticelli v. Dow Chem. Co. (In re "Agent Orange" Prods. Liab. Li-
tig.), 611 F. Supp. 1285 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (upholding denial of class status to for-
mer University of Hawaii employees claiming exposure to Agent Orange
during testing and granting defendants' motion for summary judgment be-
cause plaintiffs, among other things, failed to show causation); In re "Agent
Orange" Prods. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1223 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (granting sum-
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summary judgment for the defendants despite the plaintiffs'
tender of expert testimony linking Agent Orange with health
effects. The epidemiological studies played a key role in these
decisions.7" "The numerous epidemiological studies ... are suf-
ficient to shift the burden to plaintiffs of showing that a mate-
rial fact exists as to causation." 74 Judge Weinstein ruled the
plaintiffs' expert testimony inadmissible,75 and then granted
summary judgment because the plaintiffs had no admissible ev-
idence to counter the defendants' epidemiological studies.
76
Judge Weinstein's stress on the epidemiological data seems
consistent with the pattern of rulings in the GBS cases, in
which the CDC epidemiological study was the key to recov-
ery.77 The D.C. Circuit, however, has permitted recovery solely
mary judgment against 281 plaintiffs who opted out of the class, because they
could not prove causation).
73. See Lilley, 611 F. Supp. at 1275-76; Hogan, 611 F. Supp. at 1295 (judicial
notice taken of epidemiological studies); Fraticelli, 611 F. Supp. at 1289 (refer-
ring reader to affidavits on epidemiological studies discussed in related cases);
In re 'Agent Orange" Prods. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. at 1239-40. Another
leading case authority on the admissibility of epidemiological studies is Ellis v.
International Playtex, Inc., 745 F.2d 292 (4th Cir. 1984) (CDC study admissible
in toxic shock case), cited by In re 'Agent Orange" Prods. Liab. Litig., 611 F.
Supp. at 1240.
74. In re 'Agent Orange" Prods. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. at 1259.
75. Id. at 1256.
76. Id. at 1258-60. Among the key flaws in the plaintiffs' evidence were
the following.
(1) Much of the expert testimony was based on unreliable question-
naires. Id. at 1246.
(2) Animal and industrial studies did not have significant bearing on the
kind of exposure involved in the litigation. Id. at 1241.
(3) The plaintiffs' experts did not give sufficient attention to other possi-
ble causes in individual cases. Id. at 1251-55.
(4) The plaintiffs' experts did not take the government's epidemiological
studies into account. Id. at 1250. See generally id. at 1234-56.
Judge Weinstein's opinion is highly persuasive as a judgment on the mer-
its. Indeed, it reads very much like the opinion a judge would write after a
bench trial. It is not clear, however, whether these factors, which mostly go to
the weight of the evidence, should have led to a finding of inadmissibility fol-
lowed by summary judgment rather than letting the cases go to the jury. See
generally Graham, Expert Witness Testimony and the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence: Insuring Adequate Assurance of Trustworthiness, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV.
43 (suggesting that courts should augment the Federal Rules of Evidence with
common-law principles to ensure adequate trustworthiness of expert testi-
mony and help the jury evaluate such testimony). The role of the judge in
making such evidentiary determinations, and thus limiting the ability of the
jury to make the decision about an expert's credibility, is a fascinating topic,
but lies outside the scope of this paper. For an introduction to the literature,
see Korn, Law, Fact and Science in the Courts, 66 COLUM. L. REv. 1080 (1966).
77. See supra notes 58-64 and accompanying text.
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on the basis of expert clinical assessments despite a lack of sta-
tistical evidence. In Ferebee v. Chevron Chemical Co., 78 the
court stated:
Thus, a cause-effect relationship need not be clearly established by
animal or epidemiological studies before a doctor can testify that, in
his opinion, such a relationship exists. As long as the basic methodol-
ogy employed to reach such a conclusion is sound, such as use of tis-
sue samples, standard tests, and patient examination, products
liability law does not preclude recovery until a "statistically signifi-
cant" number of people have been injured or until science has had the
time and resources to complete sophisticated laboratory studies of the
chemical. In a courtroom, the test for allowing a plaintiff to recover
in a tort suit of this type is not scientific certainty but legal sufficiency
79
This language, while not inconsistent with Judge Weinstein's
rulings, seems more favorable toward the admission of expert
testimony.
Although a few courts have followed Ferebee's broader
view of admissibility, 0 the law of toxic causation is just begin-
ning to receive judicial attention. Clearly, a "Restatement of
the Law of Toxic Torts" would be premature. It is not too
early, however, to look for patterns in the cases and to begin to
undertake a theoretical analysis of the causation issue.
II. THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON TOXIC
CAUSATION
Even before the courts had begun to come to grips with the
toxic causation issue, a large theoretical literature had devel-
oped on the subject. Most of this scholarly literature concerns
the use of probabilistic evidence of causation. As this Article
explains, however, the accepted approach to determining causa-
tion is valid only in very limited circumstances.
78. 736 F.2d 1529 (D.C. Cir.), cert denied, 469 U.S. 1062 (1984). Ferebee
was a suit for damages brought by an agricultural worker against an herbicide
manufacturer. The proof of causation consisted of testimony by two treating
physicians described by the court as "eminent specialists in pulmonary
medicine." IL at 1535.
79. Id. at 1535-36.
80. Ferebee was followed in Wells v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 788 F.2d
741, 743-45 (11th Cir.), cert denied, 107 S. Ct. 437 (1986). See also Brazzell v.
United States, 788 F.2d 1352, 1359 (8th Cir. 1986). See generally Bushman v.
Halm, 798 F.2d 651, 659-60 (3d Cir. 1986) (testimony of treating physician held
adequate; expert witness on probability theory not required). For an argu-
ment in favor of the Ferebee approach, see Note, Trans-Science in Torts, 96
YALE L.J. 428 (1986).
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A. THE SCHOLARLY DEBATE ON PROPORTIONAL RECOVERY
Much of the causation debate has revolved around a single
paradigm case.81 In this paradigm case, a chemical is known to
have raised the death rate by some specified amount over the
background rate for a particular disease. For example, suppose
the normal rate of some variety of cancer among the unexposed
public is ten cases per 100,000; among the exposed population,
the rate is fifteen per 100,000. Under the "preponderance of the
evidence" standard, none of the fifteen cancer victims could re-
cover, because two-thirds of them probably would have gotten
the disease anyway (although we do not know which two-
thirds).82 Yet, it seems unjust to relieve the defendant of liabil-
ity, because the defendant very likely did cause five cancer
cases.
Several scholars have argued that these plaintiffs should
receive a recovery proportional to the probability that they
were harmed by the defendant. If the case is brought after the
cancer has developed, this can be done by giving each plaintiff
in the above example one-third of her damages.8 3 If the cancer
threat is known earlier, before actual cancer cases have oc-
curred, the defendant may be required either to pay every per-
son exposed to the chemical an amount compensating for
decreased life expectancy,8 4 or to provide each person with in-
81. See Delgado, supra note 9, at 884-86; Rosenberg, supra note 8, at 855
(In mass exposure cases, "all or at least large and gradable subclasses of those
exposed will be similarly situated with regard to their degree of disease risk,
their relationship to the firm, and the circumstances surrounding the tortious
conduct.").
82. See Delgado, supra note 9, at 886-88; Developments, supra note 4, at
1635. On the preponderance standard, see Ball, The Moment of Truth.
Probability Theory and Standards of Proof, 14 VAND. L. REV. 807, 813 (1961);
Cooper, Directions for Directed Verdicts: A Compass for Federal Courts, 55
MiNN. L. REV. 903, 956-62 (1971); Kaye, The Paradox of the Gatecrasher and
Other Stories, 1979 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 101 (explaining "preponderance of the evi-
dence" using mathematical probability).
83. See Delgado, supra note 9, at 900-01; Developments, supra note 4, at
1619-24; Robinson, supra note 9, at 751-53, 764; Note, supra note 8, at 600-01.
An essentially identical proposal (but calling for "Gestalt judgments" rather
than precise evidence) is made in Note, Causation in Torts: Burdens of Proof,
Standards of Persuasion, and Statistical Evidence, 96 YALE L.J. 376, 397-401
(1986).
84. See Landes & Posner, supra note 9, at 418, 429; Robinson, supra note
8, at 786-88; cf Note, A Suggested Remedy for Toxic Injury: Class Actions, Epi-
demiology, and Economic EfFJciency, 26 WM. & MARY L. REV. 497, 523 (1985).
This form of ex ante compensation is rejected in Hagerty v. L & L Marine
Servs., Inc., 788 F.2d 315, 319-20 (5th Cir. 1986); Herber v. Johns-Manville
Corp., 785 F.2d 79, 82 (3d Cir. 1986); Anderson v. W.R. Grace & Co., 628 F.
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surance covering one-third of the damages resulting from this
sort of cancer.85 Regardless of the mechanics, the result is to
expand compensation beyond the plaintiffs who actually got
cancer from the chemical while correspondingly reducing each
plaintiff's recovery.
Powerful arguments have been made in favor of propor-
tional recovery. Sindell has already established that a plaintiff
may recover without proving a particular defendant was the
cause of the injury.86 Proportional recovery inverts Sindell, al-
lowing recovery where the uncertainty concerns the identity of
the injured party rather than that of the defendant. A general
consensus seems to exist in favor of blurring the causation re-
quirement in the Sindell situation of the "indeterminate de-
fendant." It seems but a small additional step to do so here for
the "indeterminate plaintiff."87 Another point in favor of pro-
portional recovery is that it guarantees that the defendant pays
the plaintiffs as a class for the full amount of injury done by
the chemical. The defendant is thus given a powerful economic
incentive to avoid imposing this harm. Without proportional
recovery, the defendant would often escape liability altogether
because of the causation problems. Economic theory indicates
that requiring defendants to "internalize" these costs increases
economic efficiency. 8 Finally, imposing liability serves the goal
Supp. 1219, 1230-31 (D. Mass. 1986); Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 189 N.J.
Super. 561, 567-68, 461 A.2d 184, 186-87 (Law Div. 1983), affd as modifwi, 202
N.J. Super. 106, 493 A.2d 1314 (App. Div.), petition and cross-petition for certi-
fication granted, 102 N.J. 306, 508 A.2d 191 (1985). But see Waffen v. United
States Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 799 F.2d 911, 917-18 (4th Cir. 1986)
(allowing medical malpractice action for loss of "substantial possibility of sur-
vival"); Jackson III, 781 F.2d 394, 409-13 (5th Cir.) (upholding award for risk of
cancer where plaintiff "established that he will probably get cancer," id. at
411), cert denied; 106 S. Ct. 3339 (1986); DePass v. United States, 721 F.2d 203,
208-10 (7th Cir. 1983) (Posner, J., dissenting) (noting sufficient evidence to es-
tablish a right to recovery for reduction in life expectancy). See generally
Grayson v. Irvmar Realty Corp., 7 A.D.2d 436, 440, 184 N.Y.S.2d 33, 34-35
(1959) (damages for future earnings may be based on future probabilities and
award is not confined to actual earnings before accident); Schaefer, Uncer-
tainty and the Law of Damages, 19 WM. & MARY L. REV. 719, 725-29 (1978)
(proposing a reduced damage award for plaintiff's lost opportunity to receive
earnings because of the uncertainty of valuing them).
85. See Roe, supra note 5, at 866; Developments, supra note 4, at 1652-54;
Comment, Increased Risk of Disease from Hazardous Waste: A Proposal for
Judicial Relief, 60 WASH. L. REv. 635, 648-52 (1985).
86. See supra notes 26-33 and accompanying text.
87. This line of argument is developed at length in Delgado, supra note 9.
88. See Landes & Posner, supra note 9, at 431-32; Rosenberg, supra note 8,
at 865; Shavell, An Analysis of Causation and the Scope of Liability in the
Law of Torts, 9 J. LEGAL STuu. 463, 475-85 (1980). Some of the costs of serious
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of "loss spreading" by shifting some of the loss from individuals
to firms that can often pass on the cost of insurance to their
customers. Thus, the general policies of tort law are advanced
by allowing proportional recovery.89
Although the great weight of scholarly authority-along
with some impressive support from outside the academy 9 0 -fa-
vors proportional recovery, some dissenters do exist. One
counter-argument has been based on objections to basing recov-
ery wholly on probabilistic evidence.91 Viewing proportional
recovery as a matter of evidence law, as some of its proponents
have presented it, 92 does appear to represent a radical depar-
ture from traditional standards of proof.9 3 Proportional recov-
ery does not, however, really change the evidentiary standard.94
diseases, however, are ultimately borne by the public. See Comment, Plain-
tiffs' Conduct As a Defense To Claims Against Cigarette Manufacturers, 99
HARV. L. REV. 809, 823 (1986). As to whether imposing liability does indeed
deter firms, see infra note 103.
89. See Delgado, supra note 9, at 891-95; Robinson, supra note 9, at 736-49.
The connection between causation and cost-internalization is emphasized in
Dean Calabresi's seminal article. See Calabresi, Concerning Cause and the
Law of Torts: An Essay for Harry Kalven, Jr., 43 U. CH. L. REV. 69, 85-86
(1975).
90. See ABA SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON THE TORT LIABILITY SYSTEM, To-
WARDS A JURISPRUDENCE OF INJURY: THE CONTINUING CREATION OF A SYSTEM
OF SUBSTANTIVE JUSTICE IN AMERICAN TORT LAW, 11-60 to 11-61 (1984); Rubin,
Mass Torts and Litigation Disasters, 20 GA. L. REV. 429, 446-47 (1986); Wein-
stein, The Role of the Court in Toxic Tort Litigation, 73 GEO. L.J. 1389, 1392
(1985).
91. There is a large, very interesting, but-as we shall see-not very rele-
vant body of literature on the relationship between probability theory and evi-
dence law. For citations to most of the literature, see Cohen, Confidence in
Probability: Burdens of Persuasion in a World of Imperfect Knowledge, 60
N.Y.U. L. REv. 385, 390 n.33 (1985); Kaye, The Laws of Probability and the
Law of the Land, 47 U. Cm. L. REV. 34 (1979).
92. See Rosenberg, supra note 8, at 869-74.
93. See Wright, supra note 33, at 1826. The problems associated with
probabilistic evidence are discussed in detail in Robinson, supra note 9, at 740-
49.
94. As Professor Charles Nesson has cogently explained, in cases like
Sindell,
[Tihe courts generated a new definition of what was relevant to a
finding of liability and thus generated a new rule of substantive law.
Whether the courts generated a good rule depends on one's assess-
ment of the rule and of the process of judicial lawmaking. Casting
these issues as problems of proof serves only to obscure them. The
cases concern changing the elements of the substantive legal rule; the
problem of proof is simply that of generating acceptable conclusions
about those elements.
Nesson, The Evidence or the Event? On Judicial Proof and the Acceptability of
Verdicts;, 98 HARv. L. REV. 1357, 1384 (1985) (footnote omitted).
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Plaintiffs must still establish by a preponderance of the evi-
dence the facts needed to recover; namely, their exposure to a
toxic substance and the statistical effect of that substance on
the cancer rate. Establishing these facts entitles them to a rem-
edy; the link between the established facts and the remedy is
more a matter of substantive than evidence law.9
5
Another argument is that we should compensate only for
actual harm, not unrealized risks.96 Providing proportional
compensation to disease victims need not be viewed, however,
as compensation for mere exposure to a risk. Rather, compen-
sation is directed, as precisely as possible given highly limited
information, to those who actually suffer injury because of the
defendant's conduct. Because these victims cannot be identified
precisely, the "fund" must be spread over a larger class, but
this is not inconsistent with the basic purpose of compensating
actual victims as fully as possible.97 Thus, proportional recov-
ery need not be conceptualized as compensation for risk as
such, but rather as a means of compensating for actual harm
given limited information about causation.98
The final major argument made against proportional recov-
95. This can be seen most clearly when proportional recovery is given ex
ante by requiring the defendant to provide cancer insurance to the plaintiff
class. Apart from timing, however, there is no difference between this insur-
ance remedy and the ex post proportional remedy.
96. Thus, Professor Richard W. Wright argues, we should provide com-
pensation only when, looking backwards, a court can discern that the defend-
ant actually harmed the plaintiff, not when the defendant has merely created
a probability of harm. See Wright, Actual Causation vs. Probabilistic Linkage:
The Bane of Economic Analysis, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 435, 437-39 (1985); Wright,
supra note 33, at 1814-16, 1825-26. See also Sherman, Agent Orange and the
Problem of the Indeterminate Plaintiff, 52 BROOKLYN L. REV. 369, 392-93
(1986) (using statistical probabilities for causation in essence creates a new
cause of action).
97. See Rosenberg, supra note 8, at 882. Proportional compensation is a
hybrid: a substantive rule based on evidentiary concerns. The criticisms dis-
cussed in the text would be appropriate if proportional compensation were an
evidentiary rule or if it had substantive purposes. By combining evidentiary
and substantive elements, however, proportional compensation avoids both
kinds of attacks.
98. Although ex ante compensation (given before the harm materializes)
may appear quite different, requiring defendants to provide insurance cover-
age to those at risk (or cash with which to pay the premiums) is functionally
no different from making a payment once the injury has materialized. Logi-
cally, no difference exists between compensation for an unrealized risk and
compensation to all of those ultimately harmed when the risk materializes.
Given smoothly functioning markets, compensation for the risk is equivalent
to paying for insurance, which in turn is equivalent to ex post liability. See
Developments, supra note 4, at 1651-53.
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ery is more fundamental. It is simply that society should scrap
the entire tort system, relying instead on government regula-
tion plus some kind of administrative compensation scheme.
Some commentators advocate an administrative compensation
scheme for victims of toxic chemicals.9 9 Whatever its other
merits, this suggestion does little to resolve the causation prob-
lem because identifying the "victims" who will receive compen-
sation simply involves another form of the same causation
problem.10 0 Other commentators propose avoiding this diffi-
culty with a comprehensive welfare system that would fully
compensate victims of all diseases, whatever the cause. 0 1 Un-
fortunately, despite its possible theoretical merits, this scheme
avoids the conceptual difficulties of the causation issue only by
demanding what presently seems a political miracle.
In any event, these radical proposals seem too quick to re-
ject the possible deterrent value of the tort system. Although
subject to dispute,10 2 substantial evidence does exist of this de-
terrent effect.10 3 In toxics cases, deterrence is probably dimin-
99. See Elliott, supra note 8, at 801, 805. A limited version of this proposal
is embodied in Minnesota's recently enacted victim's compensation law. See
1985 Minn. Laws, 1st Special Sess. ch. 8 §§ 4-16 (H.F. No. 6) (effective July 1,
1985) (codified at MiNN. STAT. §§ 115B.25 -.37 (1986)).
100. Elliott, supra note 8, at 802-03, suggests that agencies could perform
generic risk assessments which could then be used in processing individual
claims. But if solid scientific evidence does not exist, the agency cannot make
a valid risk assessment any better than a court. Of course, unlike the court,
the agency could finance research. Such research might or might not produce
clear findings about risk. Given the existence of limited research funds, how-
ever, it seems preferable to give priority to projects on the basis of their contri-
bution to preventing future risks rather than the less urgent matter of
compensating past victims.
101. See Mashaw, supra note 8, at 1395; Stewart, supra note 8, at 10,218;
Sugarman, Doing Away With Tort Law, 73 CALiF. L. REv. 555, 664 (1985).
102. See Latin, Problem-Solving Behavior and Theories of Tort Liability, 73
CAuF. L. REV. 677, 682-93 (1985) (stating that there is no proof that liability
rules influence individuals' behavior); Mashaw, supra note 8, at 1394 (stating
that empirical evidence of the tort system's deterrent effect is difficult to find);
Abel, Book Review, 83 MICH. L. REV. 772, 786-87 (1985) ("Repeated empirical
studies over the last half century have shown that liability rules internalize
hardly any of the accident costs of entrepreneurial activity and have only the
most problematic effect on behavior."); but see Latin, supra, at 740 ("[M~y
analysis points to situations in which problem-solving actors are likely to be
influenced by tort liability.").
103. See Posner, Can Lawyers Solve the Problems of the Tort System? 73
CALIF. L. REV. 747, 749-50 (1985) ("[S]tudies show that liability insurance pre-
miums affect the decision to drive, that the number of automobile deaths has
risen as a result of the no-fault movement (perhaps by as much as 15% in
some states), and that safety-belt requirements increase the number of pedes-
trian deaths because people who feel safer drive faster." (footnotes omitted));
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ished by many of the same factors that make causation difficult
to prove, such as the long time lags and scientific uncertainty
about effects. On the other hand, these factors also pose seri-
ous problems for the regulatory system, which is fraught with
problems of its own.0 4 It would seem foolhardy to jettison the
tort system on the basis of current knowledge. 0 5
Thus, although proportional recovery is a substantial devia-
tion from current practice, the theoretical arguments against it
are unpersuasive. A more serious question is how often the fac-
tual assumptions underlying proportional recovery are valid.'
0 6
The key assumption-the paradigm case-is that the only evi-
dence of causation is a single statistic expressing the increased
rate of disease (or death) among the exposed population. As it
turns out, this assumption is often false. Normally, at least
some additional information is available, and a different solu-
tion becomes appropriate.
B. THE MLV REMEDY: COMPENSATING THE
MOST LIKELY VICTIMS
Generally, all of those exposed to a toxic chemical are not
equally at risk. Although the exact relationship between doses
and disease rates is often poorly understood, the risk of disease
is normally related to the amount of exposure. 0 7 The timing of
exposure may also be significant; for example, exposure to DES
early in pregnancy seems to have been much more dangerous
Rosenberg, supra note 8, at 862 n.51 ("Both the theory of profit maximization
and recent (though tentative) empirical data indicate that firms are becoming
increasingly sensitive to the prospect of tort liability.").
104. See Latin, supra note 102, at 738-39; Dwyer, Book Review, 235 SCIENCE
597, 598 (1987).
105. See Latin, supra note 102, at 740-41; Posner, supra note 103, at 752-53;
Rosenberg, Toxic Tort Litigation: Crisis or Chrysalis?, 24 HoUs. L. REV. 183,
202 (1987); Rosenberg, supra note 5, at 1695, 1704-06. For thoughtful, balanced
discussions of these issues, see Pierce, Encouraging Safety: The Limits of Tort
Law and Government Regulation, 33 VAND. L. REv. 1281 (1980); Rabin, supra
note 5, at 51.
106. Professor Richard Delgado seems to suggest that the approach will
only apply when an isolated community is exposed to a risk. See Delgado,
supra note 9, at 907. This is a serious restriction on the applicability of propor-
tional recovery.
107. See, e.g., Finkelstein & Vingilis, Radiographic Abnormalities among
Asbestos-Cement Workers: An Exposure-Response Study, 129 AM. REV. RE-
SPIRATORY DISEASES 17, 19 (1984); Newhouse, Epidemiology of Asbestos-Re-
lated Tumors, 8 SEMINARS IN ONCOLOGY 250, 252, 254 (1981); Peto, Seidman &
Selikoff, Mesothelioma Mortality in Asbestos Workers: Implications for Mod-
els of Carcinogensis and Risk Assessment 45 BRIT. J. CANCER 124, 133 (1982).
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than exposure late in pregnancy.108 Thus, the assumption of a
uniform increase above the background rate is generally
unrealistic.
Similarly, the assumption of a uniform background rate is
valid only when nothing except the link to chemical exposure
is known about a disease. Often, however, at least some knowl-
edge of other risk factors exists. For instance, cigarette smok-
ers are more likely to get lung cancer than nonsmokers, and
the difference is even greater among asbestos workers.10 9
Thus, given two individuals who have become ill after ex-
posure to a chemical, some basis often exists for believing that
the chemical was more likely to have caused one case than the
other. Using a single statistic for the entire group as a basis for
proportional recovery thus overcompensates some plaintiffs
and undercompensates others. For example, suppose the
probability of causation is thirty percent for half the group and
ten percent for the other half. Giving them all twenty percent
of their damages (the average probability for the group as a
whole) undercompensates the thirty-percent subgroup and
overcompensates the ten-percent subgroup.
One possible solution would be to divide the group into
subgroups composed of individuals with comparable risks.":0
As a practical matter, the data may not allow such fine-tuning.
There may exist only a qualitative knowledge about the distri-
bution of risk within the group, rather than the quantitative
information needed to make each subgroup's recovery propor-
tional to that subgroup's risk. For example, we might know
only that the average probability is twenty percent and that the
range is about ten to thirty percent. This is not sufficient infor-
mation to allow the creation of subgroups. More fundamen-
tally, however, proportional recovery is simply inappropriate.
To understand the proper treatment of these cases, it is
helpful to begin with a somewhat simplified example. Suppose
108. See R. APFEL & S. FISHER, To Do No HARM: DES AND THE DILEMMAS
OF MODERN MEDICINE 142 (1984); Herbst, Poskanzer, Robboy, Friedander &
Scully, Prenatal Exposure to Stilbestro" A Prospective Comparison of Exposed
Female Offspring with Unexposed Controls, 292 NEW ENG. J. MED. 334 (1975);
Herbst, Ulfelder & Poskanzer, Adenocarcinoma of the Vagina, 284 NEW ENG.
J. MED. 878 (1971). Here, as throughout this Article, discussion of particular
diseases is meant to be purely illustrative and does not purport to represent
any medical expertise whatsoever.
109. See Peto, Seidman & Selikoff, supra note 107, at 132-33 ("These data
also illustrate the approximately multiplicative effects of asbestos and smoking
for lung cancer." Id. at 133.).
110. See Rosenberg, supra note 8, at 921; Note, supra note 8, at 600-01.
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we have a single defendant D and a group of N exposed individ-
uals, X, X, ... XN. Each individual has suffered one unit of
damage due to cancer. For the individual Xi, the probability
that the defendant caused the individual's cancer is pi, with
P1>P2>.. .PN. The total amount of damage actually caused by
the defendant is M, with M < N.
The first question is how much D should pay in damages.
For much the same reasons advanced in favor of proportional
recovery, the answer would seem to be M, the total amount of
damage caused by the defendant.111 This amount provides the
proper economic deterrent to D's behavior. Even if we do not
count depriving D of these funds as an affirmative good, D has
very little ground for complaint so long as the damages are not
greater than the actual injury. After all, D would clearly be lia-
ble for this amount of damages given better evidence of causa-
tion. Allowing D to retain this amount might well be
considered unjust enrichment. At least, depriving D of money
should not count as an error, so long as the amount is no
greater than M, the total damages." 2
Next, who should get the money? The answer depends on
our purposes. We might, after all, give it to all the plaintiffs
equally, or all disease victims, or perhaps the poor. One com-
mentator argues that the individuals who actually were harmed
by D have no better claim to the money than all other individu-
als suffering from the same disease.113 This position is, to say
the least, at odds with common views of morality. If Hand
punches Cardozo in the nose at a cocktail party, most people
111. See supra notes 86-106 and accompanying text.
112. Up to this point, no difference exists between proportional recovery
and MLV. Both agree that the defendant's total damages should equal the to-
tal harm done. As Landes and Posner observe, "[Flrom an economic stand-
point, the critical point for deterrence is that the defendant pays, not that the
plaintiff receives." Landes & Posner, supra note 9, at 430. The disagreement
concerns how to distribute this "fund." Proportional recovery might seem
preferable from the perspective of loss-spreading, because fewer injured indi-
viduals are left uncompensated. But proportional recovery requires every in-
dividual to bear part of her own loss, while MLV may completely shift some
individuals' losses to firms. It is not clear that proportional recovery is really
superior as a means of spreading losses. Indeed, paying partial compensation
may even leave some victims worse off than they would be receiving no tort
recovery, because partial recoveries may make it more difficult for them to re-
ceive other forms of assistance, such as government aid.
113. See Mashaw, supra note 8, at 1394 (stating that the tort system pro-
vides no reason to distinguish for purposes of compensation between those
who were injured by natural toxins and those injured by manufactured
toxins).
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think that Hand should pay damages to Cardozo, not to
Holmes, who broke his nose the same day playing hockey.1 14
And most people would also think that Hand has a somewhat
greater moral obligation than the rest of society to pay the
medical bills resulting from his assault on Cardozo. This exam-
ple illustrates the general ethical principle of corrective
justice.115
A more difficult question is presented by the argument
that individuals should be compensated for exposure to risk,
not merely for the harm that results in some instances.1 16 As
one of the commentators who argues for risk-based compensa-
tion admits, this is a substantial deviation from normal tort law:
[I]t is difficult to conceive as a practical matter how one could have an
action for the risk of an automobile accident. Either plaintiff has
been in an accident or he has not; if he has not it seems queer to think
of bringing suit against a negligent driver for a harm that might have
occurred but did not.-1 7
114. Suppose Hand narrowly missed hitting Holmes in the nose when he
hit Cardozo instead. The fact that Hand created a risk of breaking Holmes's
nose seems irrelevant if we know that Holmes's nose was not actually broken
until the hockey game later.
115. See Rosenberg, supra note 8, at 881. If D's unreasonable conduct has
caused physical harm to others, from a nonutilitarian point of view he may be
considered to have violated their rights and hence to owe compensation. Fur-
thermore, distributing the fund equally among all disease victims may reward
those whose disease was at least partly due to their own choice of lifestyle, see
Ames, supra note 37, at 1260 (discussing naturally occurring substances that, if
ingested, may inhibit cancer), which society ought not encourage. (To the ex-
tent that lifestyle is a likely cause of an individual's illness, it becomes that
much less likely that the defendant was the cause, so the individual moves
lower on the "MLV list.")
As Dean Calabresi has pointed out, concepts like "causation" are used
both to accomplish the articulated goals of the tort system and to incorporate
intuitive and ill-understood concepts of justice, which should nevertheless not
be ignored. See Calabresi, supra note 89, at 107-08. Such intuitions are likely
to play a larger role in deciding on the values to be served by a legal rule than
in working out the best means of achieving these values.
116. See Landes & Posner, supra note 9, at 428-31; Robinson, supra note 8,
at 796-98. Landes and Posner seem as much concerned about the timing of
compensation as who receives it; they favor risk-based compensation largely
because it can be determined soon after the defendant's conduct. See Landes
& Posner, supra note 9, at 431. But MLV is not inconsistent with imposing
liability before the injury develops if the relevant probabilities are known.
Under MLV, the defendant would purchase full insurance coverage for those
plaintiffs who are in the "most likely victim" class. Those among this class
who ultimately develop illnesses would receive full compensation; others ex-
posed to the toxic substance would not receive compensation. Thus, the ques-
tion of timing can be separated from the question of how to distribute the
fund.
117. Robinson, supra note 8, at 797.
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The only real difference between the automobile case and the
toxics case is that better information is available about the
events in the automobile case whereas the relevant biological
events in the toxics case are unobservable. If some method did
exist of determining the cause of a particular plaintiff's cancer,
courts would presumably follow the normal rules of tort law
and award damages only to plaintiffs who could show actual
causation. Imperfect information prevents us from implement-
ing this rule, but the compensation scheme should attempt to
approximate the result as much as possible.118
Assume, then, that the goal is to compensate those whose
injuries were actually caused by the defendant so that each dol-
lar going to such a plaintiff is counted as a success. We may not
begrudge the other plaintiffs their money (after all, they have
suffered a serious illness), but we would prefer that the money
went to D's "actual victims." If we let S be the amount of
money successfully distributed to D's actual victims, then the
statistically expected value of S is simply plz + . . . pvzN, where
zi is the amount of damages received by the ith victim. Pre-
sumably, we do not wish to give any plaintiff more than his ac-
tual damages (set at one unit). This gives us the simple
mathematical problem of maximizing the expected value of S.
The solution is to give the M units of damages to the M
plaintiffs with the highest probabilities of being actual victims,
giving nothing to the remaining plaintiffs. The formal proof is
given in the Appendix. 19 The basic reason, however, is fairly
118. From the perspective of economic efficiency, it makes little difference
whether compensation is based on risk or actual causation as determined ex
post. Primary conduct can only be shaped by the information available ex
ante, which must be based on the probability of harm. On the other hand,
some efficiency arguments can be made in favor of harm-based liability. First,
the number of lawsuits is decreased, which reduces some costs of the legal sys-
tem. Second, if individuals are risk-averse, as economists commonly assume,
they would prefer to be guaranteed compensation for their injuries rather
than to be given in advance the actuarial value of the risk. But the common-
law's preference for basing compensation on actual injury probably rests more
on a concept of fairness than on efficiency. Someone who is subjected to a risk
may incur some costs for which compensation is arguably appropriate, such as
medical expenses or mental distress, see supra note 21, but the mere existence
of the risk does no harm in itself unless the injury materializes. Consider the
individual who is subjected to risk of which that individual never becomes
aware. The potential harm never materializes. It seems clear that allowing
compensation for the existence of the risk would simply provide a windfall to
the plaintiff.
119. Appendix, injfra p. 1260. Somewhat similarly, Professor David Kaye
argues that, when the plaintiff's injury is known but the identity of the de-
fendant is not, error costs are minimized by imposing liability on the most
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obvious. If we take a dollar from a plaintiff high on the
probability list and give it to one lower down the list, the odds
are less that the new recipient is an actual victim. So we can
maximize the odds that the money will go to actual victims by
loading as much as possible high on the list. Because the only
constraint is that no victim should receive more than a unit of
damages, we give one unit to the victim with the highest
probability and keep going down the list until we run out of
money with victim M + 1. This is the MLV or "most likely vic-
tim" approach to compensation.
Obviously, literally ranking all victims is impractical in ac-
tual litigation. The MLV solution can be approximated, how-
ever, by putting the victims in subgroups, going down the list of
subgroups, paying full compensation to each subgroup, until the
defendant's total damages have been exhausted. 20 Implement-
ing MLV is more difficult if each plaintiff brings a separate case
but the problems do not seem insurmountable, as we will see in
Part III. 1
An example may help clarify the differences between the
various methods of compensation. Suppose we have a group of
fifty-one people who have developed cancer after exposure to a
drug. Based on the amount of exposure and the individuals'
other risk characteristics, we have determined the probability
that each individual's cancer was caused by the drug. The first
individual has a fifty-one percent probability of causation, the
second individual has a fifty percent probability, the third has a
forty-nine percent probability, all the way down to the fifty-
first person, who has a probability of only one percent. The av-
erage probability of causation is twenty-six percent. Each indi-
vidual has suffered one million dollars in damages. This means
that we can expect that the drug caused about thirteen cases of
likely defendant. See Kaye, The Limits of the Preponderance of the Evidence
Standard.- Justifiably Naked Statistical Evidence and Multiple Causation, 1982
AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 487, 503-08. This is essentially the converse of the MLV
approach. Another analogous method is used in cost-benefit problems involv-
ing budget restrictions. See E. STOKEY & R. ZECKHAUsER, A PRIMER FOR POL-
icy ANALYsis 142-44 (1978).
120. If the last subgroup to be compensated has total damages greater than
the amount remaining in the "fund," the members of the subgroup can be
given pro rata compensation.
121. One possibility is to adopt MLV directly as the standard of recovery,
using it as the basis for expert testimony and jury instructions. Another possi-
bility is to use MLV as the basis for a series of presumptions to apply in indi-
vidual cases. See infra notes 131-32 and 159-60 and accompanying text for
some methods of adapting MLV to individual cases.
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cancer (twenty-six percent of fifty-one individuals), or thirteen
million dollars in damages.
Under the traditional preponderance standard, only one in-
dividual (the highest person on the list) can show that the drug
"more likely than not" caused her disease. Hence, she receives
one million dollars and the defendant is relieved of any liability
for the remaining twelve million dollars of damages caused by
the drug. This is an unjustifiable windfall to the defendant.
Under proportional recovery, each individual receives a
percentage of his damages. This avoids any windfall to the de-
fendant, but distributes the fund poorly. For example, the indi-
vidual with a one percent probability of causation gets one
percent of his damages, or $10,000. The odds are overwhelming
(ninety-nine to one) that this money is going to someone who is
not actually a victim of the drug. If we transferred the pay-
ment to the top person on the list, we would have better than
even odds that the recipient would be an actual victim.
MLV does a better job of targeting victims. Under MLV,
we start at the top of the list and pay off the claims in full until
we run out of money. This means that the top thirteen people
on the list get full compensation; those with causation
probabilities below thirty-eight percent get nothing. If we were
to move a dollar from the top group to the bottom group, we
would necessarily lower the odds that the money was going to
an actual victim. Under MLV, the defendant pays out a total of
thirteen million dollars, thus avoiding any windfall, and as
much as possible of the money is directed to actual victims.
Thus, the MLV approach maximizes the amount of money
going to plaintiffs whose injuries were actually caused by the
defendant. It has some other advantages over proportional re-
covery. 2 2 Plaintiffs who are low on the probability list may not
really be even "possible victims" of the defendant, let alone ac-
tual victims. Probability information is unlikely to be perfectly
reliable; the lower the probability assigned a given plaintiff, the
more likely that the true probability is zero.123 Also, applying
proportional recovery to a heterogenous group requires reliable
quantitative information about subgroups. To apply propor-
tional recovery, we must know not only that members of sub-
122. Because MLV generally gives each individual plaintiff either no dam-
ages or full compensation, it is consistent with the "all or nothing" tradition of
the common law. Despite its novelty, this should make it more acceptable
than proportional recovery to courts.
123. See Cohen, supra note 91, at 397-404.
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group A had higher risks than those in subgroup B, but also the
precise amount of the difference in risk in order to calculate
the recovery percentages. In contrast, MLV requires only a
qualitative ranking of subgroups. Epidemiological knowledge is
expensive, hard to obtain, and often imprecise. The less we
need to demand of the epidemiologists, the better.
At a more intuitive level, as we go further down the
probability list, the possibility that the defendant caused the
plaintiff's injury becomes increasingly speculative. It makes
sense to compensate those with the strongest claim of injury
and cut off the most speculative claims. In a sense, MLV is a
form of triage. 24 Rather than spread resources equally over all
claimants or divide them in proportion to the strength of the
claims, MLV directs compensation to those with the strongest
claims.32- 5
Two possible objections to MLV should be addressed.
First, MLV could be criticized for giving a windfall to some
groups while knowingly undercompensating others. Admit-
tedly, MLV does not achieve equity between groups of victims,
because some groups known to contain some victims receive no
compensation. Unfortunately, any attempt to achieve inter-
group equity necessarily increases the amount of money going
to individuals whose injuries were not in reality caused by the
defendant. Thus, greater equity between groups can only be
purchased at the expense of less fairness to individuals.
Second, MLV may strike some readers as counterintuitive.
Given two victims with speculative causation cases, why should
one get all the money, simply because her causation evidence is
a bit less speculative? Suppose that A proves a forty-percent
chance of causation, while B proves a twenty-percent likeli-
hood. If each has damages of $100,000, under MLV victim A
will get $60,000, that being the statistically expected value of
124. "Triage" is a commonly used term in medicine, referring to "the sort-
ing of and allocation of treatment to patients and ... victims according to a
system of priorities designed to maximize the number of survivors." WEB-
sTER's THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIoNARY 2439 (1976).
125. MLV relates to the determination of liability. Similar problems arise
in two other contexts. First, in settling a class action, a limited fund must be
distributed among the class. MLV is in theory the proper solution. The exi-
gencies of negotiation, however, including the need to "buy" the consent of
some subclasses, may require some modification in the direction of propor-
tional recovery. Second, the defendant's assets may be less than the total
harm, which determines the MLV cut-off point. Once liability is determined
under MLV, the bankruptcy laws then determine the distribution of the de-
fendant's limited assets among the claimants.
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the total harm caused by the defendant. B gets nothing, and
this may seem harsh. If, however, we transfer a dollar from A
to B, we double the odds that the dollar is going to someone
who, if we knew more about causation, would receive nothing.
It seems indefensible to transfer money from A to someone
who is only half as likely truly to deserve it.
Thus, in many toxics cases, ILV seems to be the appropri-
ate form of recovery. As we shall see in the next section, how-
ever, not all toxic tort cases neatly fit either the MLV or
proportional recovery molds, although 1MfLV theory can still
give useful guidance in some cases where it cannot be applied
directly.
III. A TAXONOMY OF TOXIC CAUSATION CASES
Current understanding of toxic torts is as yet fairly limited.
What is clear is that toxics cases come in many forms. So far,
the legal literature has failed to take this diversity seriously, fo-
cusing instead on selected cases that are assumed to be typi-
cal. 12 6 Of the six categories of cases discussed below, only one
has received substantial scholarly attention.
A. CONCLUSIVE EVIDENCE ON CAUSATION: "SIGNATURE
DISEASE" AND "No CAUSATION" CASES
The scholarly literature might easily give the impression
that toxic causation is invariably mysterious.127 In many cases,
however, the causation issue is quite clear-cut.
One group of cases involves so-called "signature" dis-
eases.128 These are diseases that are extremely rare in the gen-
126. One of the few exceptions is the discussion in Elliott, Goal Analysis
versus Institutional Analysis of Toxic Compensation Systems, 73 GEO. L.J.
1357, 1369 (1985). Professor E. Donald Elliott's discussion, however, is wholly
concerned with the question of which legal institution-courts, administrative
agencies, or legislatures-should address particular toxics problems, rather
than what standards should be applied to these problems regardless of the in-
stitution considering them. See id& at 1372-75.
127. See, e.g., Note, supra note 2, at 840 ("[Cancer victims nearly always
fail to recover damages in tort because they are unable to meet traditional
standards of proof."). This must have been welcome news to the Johns-
Manville Corporation. See also Elliott, supra note 8, at 802 ("It is rare indeed
that anything like the information base necessary to make even rough
probability estimates [of risk] will exist.").
128. See K. ABRAHAM, supra note 5, at 22-23 ("[W]hen a particular disease
is caused almost exclusively by a particular substance... the disease is ... the
substance's 'signature,'" id at 23.). Stewart, supra note 8, at 10,213, notes that
"signature diseases" present fewer problems for the legal system.
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eral population but far more prevalent among those exposed to
a particular substance; the disease in a sense bears the signa-
ture of the substance. A classic example is mesothelioma, an
unusual, lethal form of cancer. Most cases are associated with
exposure to asbestos. The odds of contracting mesothelioma
are roughly seventy times greater for asbestos workers than for
members of the general population.12 9 This means that when
an asbestos worker gets mesothelioma, it is almost certainly
caused by asbestos.' 3 0
We might, following the proportional recovery theory, re-
duce the damages paid each worker by a small fraction to rep-
resent the remote possibility that the mesothelioma might not
be asbestos-induced. Given the inevitable crudeness of the tort
system, such fine-tuning seems somewhat inappropriate, rather
like putting velvet gloves on the proverbial bull in the china
shop. In view of the small magnitude of the correction, the
amount of trial time that might be spent quibbling about the
proper adjustment factor, and the likelihood that any overpay-
ment to these plaintiffs is balanced by nonpayment to some
plaintiffs with other asbestos-induced diseases, it hardly seems
worthwhile to make the correction. Rather, the proper ap-
proach would seem to be an irrebuttable presumption of causa-
tion in mesothelioma cases.13 1
A similar situation holds in some DES cases. Clear-cell ad-
enocarcinoma is a very rare form of cancer occasionally found
in the unexposed population, particularly among older women.
The risk of contracting the disease when younger, however, is
far higher for DES daughters than for other women.'3 2 Thus, a
presumption of causation seems warranted. 3
3
129. See Black & Lilienfeld, supra note 7, at 758.
130. Thus, it is only a slight exaggeration for legal purposes to say that as-
bestos is the "only cause" of mesothelioma, Note, supra note 1, at 1304. See
Peto, Seidman & Selikoff, supra note 107, at 125 ("Mesothelioma is so rare
among those not exposed to asbestos that incidental cases in heavily exposed
populations can be neglected.").
131. Lest the reader dismiss this example as too rare to deserve extended
discussion, it should be noted that some experts project 19,000 cases by the end
of this century. See P. BRODEUR, OUTRAGEOUS MIscoNDucT: THE ASBESTOS
INDUSTRY ON TRiAL 266'(1985). The estimate of projected cases may be exces-
sively conservative. See i&L at 264-67.
132. See Bohrer, supra note 21, at 97 n.48 ("DES daughters suffer a risk 100
times greater than is normal of developing the deadly cancer."); Herbst,
Ulfelder & Poskanzer, supra note 108.
133. It is not easy to get accurate statistics for the excess risk because the
number of women exposed to DES is not known. The risk that an individual
DES daughter will develop clear-cell adenocarcinoma by age 24 is about
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The MLV approach strengthens the argument for an ir-
rebuttable presumption of causation. Victims of "signature dis-
eases" are clearly in the category of "most likely victims."
Hence, MLV theory indicates that their claims should be paid
in full, while cutting off speculative claims at the other end of
the spectrum.
Causation also poses no great conceptual problem in an-
other set of cases. These are the cases in which the evidence
affirmatively disproves the possibility of a causal link. To date,
the most important example is found in the Agent Orange
cases, in which Judge Weinstein found no admissible evidence
of causation and powerful epidemiological evidence disproving
causation. Although the correctness of his admissibility ruling
may be debatable, 134 Judge Weinstein's opinion makes it clear
that the weight of the evidence was strongly against the plain-
tiffs. Apparently, Agent Orange simply did not pose long-term
risks to its users.' 35 These "no causation" cases may involve
difficult matters of proof and may raise real concerns about
jury control, but they do not require any conceptual inquiry
into the role of causation in tort law. 36
B. "PURELY STATISTICAL" AND "STATISTICS PLUS" CASES
The first of these categories corresponds to the propor-
tional recovery paradigm discussed in section A of Part II. As
was shown there, proportional recovery is normally the proper
1/1000. But the total cancer death rate for women between 20 and 25 is
4/100,000. See Payton v. Abbott Labs, 386 Mass. 540, 542-43, 437 N.E.2d 171,
173-74 (1982); R. APFEL & S. FISHER, eura note 108, at 48. If we assume (con-
servatively) a mortality rate of only 33%, this would give an overall cancer
rate in this age group of 12/100,000, and a clear-cell adenocarcinoma rate of
100/100,000. (Any error in these figures is probably more than offset by the
relatively small contribution of clear-cell adenocarcinoma to the overall cancer
rate.) So, if a woman in this age group who was exposed to DES has adenocar-
cinoma, we can conservatively give odds of about ten to one that DES was the
cause. There must be any number of criminal defendants convicted every year
on weaker evidence under the standard of "proof beyond a reasonable doubt."
(The usual disclaimer applies: this discussion is meant to be merely illustrative
and reflects no claim to medical expertise.)
134. See supra note 76.
135. See supra notes 65-77 and accompanying text. But cf Pekkanen, Book
Review, Washington Post Nat'l Weekly Ed., Nov. 24, 1986, at 35 (citing a recent
study showing an elevated lymphoma rate related to exposure to herbicides).
136. Affirmative findings of "no causation" are not limited to mass tort
cases like the Agent Orange cases, but are also made in individual personal in-
jury actions. See, e.g., Dawsey v. Olin Corp., 782 F.2d 1254, 1261 (5th Cir. 1986);
Richardson v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 15 Prod. Safety & Liab. Rep. (BNA) 32
(D.D.C. Dec. 19, 1986).
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remedy if our only information is a uniform increase in a uni-
form background rate. It is rather difficult, however, to find
any examples of this situation.
The "statistics plus" cases are much more common. In
these cases, we have statistics demonstrating an overall in-
crease in the incidence of a disease, as well as information indi-
cating varying degrees of increased risk within the exposed
group. For example, the risk of lung cancer among asbestos
workers is apparently affected by the type of asbestos used in
an industry, the length and degree of exposure, and cigarette
smoking (even taking into account the direct effect of smoking
on lung cancer).13 7 In these cases, the proper solution is the
MLV remedy. We should pay full compensation to those with
the highest risks attributable to asbestos, for example, cigarette
smokers with high asbestos exposure in high-risk industries,
and no compensation to those with the lowest risks, for exam-
ple, nonsmokers with low exposure in low-risk industries.1 38
Such an outcome is suggested by the results of the swine
flu litigation. Those who contracted GBS within ten weeks of
innoculation were the most likely victims and received full
compensation from the government. Those who contracted
GBS after the ten-week period generally received nothing.139
C. DIFFUSE RISKS
Another category of cases involves very small increases to
existing widespread risks. For example, some estimates indi-
cate that carcinogens in drinking water may cause roughly a
thousand cases of cancer nationwide annually.140 Such infor-
137. See COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, supra note 1, at 224; Peto,
Seidman & Selikoff, supra note 107. Exposure and risk seem to vary among
workers in different industries, see, e.g., Flatt v. Johns Manville Sales Corp.,
488 F. Supp. 836, 840 (E.D. Tex. 1980) (noting that "[d]ifferences in end uses of
... products, percentage of asbestos content of the products, and environmen-
tal conditions present when the products were used are all [relevant] factors").
This may be a useful means of making MLV determinations.
138. Cf. Dartez v. Fibreboard Corp., 765 F.2d 456, 471 (5th Cir. 1985) (deny-
ing recovery against a defendant where exposure period was slight and indus-
try had low asbestos emission rate). With respect to cigarette smoking, the
discussion puts to the side the complex issue of victim care discussed in Landes
& Posner, supra note 9, at 432-34. For further discussion, see Rosenberg,
supra note 5, at 1703-04; Note, Plaintiffs' Conduct as a Defense to Claims
Against Cigarette Manufacturers, 99 HARv. L. REV. 809 (1986).
139. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
140. See Page, Harris & Bruser, Waterborne Carcinogens: An Economist's
View, in THE SCIENTIFIC BASIS OF HEALTH AND SAFETY REGULATION 213-15
(R. Crandall & L. Lave eds. 1981). Estimates of risk ranged from 12 cases per
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mation may provide a sufficiently reliable basis for government
regulation.1 41 For three reasons, however, compensation for
such diffuse risks, whether administered by courts or adminis-
trative agencies, is far more problematic.- 42
First, because of the difficulties of conducting epidemiologi-
cal studies of these diffuse risks, the estimates of risk are ex-
tremely unreliable.143 For example, in the drinking water
example, risk estimates varied by an order of magnitude.
Other regulatory cases contain estimates varying over even
greater ranges.144 Even when the estimates are available at the
time of a chemical's release, their extraordinary unreliability
would make it extremely difficult for the discharger to foresee
the extent of future liability. This makes any deterrent effect
highly speculative at best.
Further, because the level of risk is often quite low in
these cases,145 even under a proportional liability scheme the
individual recoveries could be very small-perhaps on the order
of one to ten percent of an individual's damages.146 Thus, corn-
million to 340 cases per million; even the epidemiological studies showed about
one order of magnitude in variation among the estimates. The authors consid-
ered 300 cases per million to be a high estimate, and 150 cases per million to be
medium. Id. at 215.
141. See Kimm, Kuzmack & Schnare, Waterborne Carcinogens: A Regula-
tor's View, in THE ScIENTIFic BAsis OF HEALTH AND SAFETY REGULATION 229
(R. Crandall & L. Lave eds. 1981).
142. Professor Elliott suggests the possibility of a broad-based tax and com-
pensation scheme to avoid the administrative difficulties, but ignores the lim-
ited utility of such a scheme, given the other two factors discussed in the text:
the unreliability of the risk assessments and the small degree of loss spreading
generally possible. See Elliott, supra note 126, at 1370-71. If we are interested
in spreading the loss of such widespread risks, we would probably be better off
instituting a general welfare state rather than tying compensation to any par-
ticular cause of an injury.
143. See Elliott, supra note 8, at 802 (observing that "[i]t is rare indeed that
anything like the information base necessary to make even rough probability
estimates will exist").
144. The National Academy of Science estimated that the total number of
bladder cancers caused by a lifetime of exposure to saccharin ranged from less
than one case to one million per year. Id
145. Consider the recent estimate, made after a thorough study, that the
number of injuries annually caused by hazardous wastes in Minnesota is "in
the tens of persons." Prince, supra note 4, at 673.
146. An illustration is suggested by recent estimates of the risks created by
waterborne carcinogens. If the "low" risk estimate for waterborne carcinogens
turned out to be correct, about 1% of all cancers, or 4% of urinary and gastro-
intestinal cancers, would be attributable to this source. Under proportional re-
covery, victims would receive either 1% or 4% of their damages, depending on
which figure was deemed most relevant. See Page, Harris & Bruser, supra
note 140, at 215. On the other hand, if the high estimate of risk turned out to
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pensation for diffuse risks often would not substantially serve
the goal of loss spreading.147 Moreover, in cases involving ex-
tremely low-risk levels, the vast majority of recipients would be
individuals who were not in fact harmed by the chemicals.
Thus, in these cases, compensation has little to recommend it
even from the "victim's perspective."
Finally, for many diffuse risks, any compensation scheme
would involve high transaction costs. To take the example of
drinking water, the cost of compensation would have to be
somehow allocated among thousands of municipalities and in-
dustrial sources. Some method would have to be devised for
distributing the proceeds among the enormous group148 of can-
cer patients in this country. The entire proceeding would be
complicated still more, of course, by the high degree of uncer-
tainty about the total risk and how it is distributed among the
populations, what chemicals create the greatest part of the risk,
which individuals are most affected, and so forth.149 In a sys-
tem with unlimited resources, it might be worth confronting
these difficulties, but both the administrative and judicial sys-
tems have higher priorities than this.
As information about particular toxic substances expands,
some risks may be well enough understood to allow the crea-
tion of a sensible compensation system based on the MLV the-
be valid, waterborne carcinogens would be responsible for a significant propor-
tion of urinary and gastrointestinal cancers, and this argument would not
apply.
147. See Stewart, supra note 8, at 10,214-15.
148. The average annual cancer mortality rate in the United States is about
1673 per million for all cancers, and 536 for gastrointestinal and urinary tract
cancers. See Page, Harris & Bruser, supra note 140, at 215. Thus, there are
over 100,000 deaths annually from the latter forms of cancer.
149. There are many thousands of organic chemicals in drinking
water. Already identified are over 700, which represent only 15 per-
cent by weight of all organic matter found in drinking water. Only a
few have been tested for carcinogenicity in the usual animal tests.
The agency has conducted several surveys of water from different sys-
tems and has found that the levels of measurable chemicals vary
widely from system to system and even from day to day. It would
therefore be difficult to derive a risk estimate based on this fragmen-
tary occurrence data, even for those measurable chemicals that have
been tested for carcinogenicity. The agency has not been able to think
of any way to estimate the risk to public health posed by compounds
that cannot be measured or that have not been tested for carcinoge-
nicity. Nor do methodologies exist for dealing with the potential ef-
fects of human exposure to mixtures of carcinogens, including
possible synergistic effects.
Kimm, Kuzmack & Schnare, supra note 141, at 241.
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ory.150 At present, however, most diffuse risks cannot be
meaningfully made the subject of compensation. 51 This means,
unfortunately, that some individuals whose injuries are actually
due to these risks will be unable to obtain compensation, simply
because we have no way to identify likely victims among the
huge crowd of possibilities. Although compensation rules can
be adapted to deal with less than certain knowledge of causa-
tion, there comes a point at which uncertainty becomes over-
whelming. Any attempt to press compensation beyond that
point is counterproductive.
D. CLINICAL PROOF CASES
Some toxics cases do not fit the statistical mold of the cases
we have discussed so far. Rather than relying on statistical evi-
dence, the plaintiff may simply present the testimony of ex-
perts familiar with the facts of the case, giving their opinion
that toxic exposure was the cause of the injury. If they contra-
dict more rigorous epidemiological evidence, these clinical as-
sessments should be given little weight.152 Often, however,
more reliable information is unavailable.
A scientist might well find such clinical judgments an inad-
equate basis for drawing firm conclusions about causation. Ex-
perience has shown many ways in which clinical judgments can
go awry.153 Nevertheless, this does not mean that the clinical
judgment is more likely false than true; it means only that the
scientist considers the likelihood of falsity unacceptably high.
Given the difference in purposes and institutional settings, the
acceptable level of error for scientific judgments may well be
lower than the forty-nine percent the law tolerates. Thus, a
per se rule excluding compensation based on clinical judgments
seems unwarranted. 154
On the other hand, such clinical judgments present real
150. This requires fairly reliable estimates of the degree of risk and identi-
fication of an MLV group (based on exposure, other risk factors, and type of
disease), plus some method of distributing the cost.
151. For further discussion, see K. ABRAHAM, supra note 5, at 27-28.
152. See supra notes 65-77 and accompanying text (discussing the Agent
Orange litigation).
153. For a series of examples, see R. APFEL & S. FISHER, supra note 108, at
29-42. The unreliability of such clinical judgments is the very reason why
more rigorous epidemiological methods were developed.
154. Thus, cases allowing recovery on the basis of such evidence seem cor-
rect. See supra notes 78-80 and accompanying text (discussing Ferebee and re-
lated cases).
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risks even in a nonadversary setting.155 These risks are magni-
fied by the prospect of "expert shopping" by plaintiffs. 56
Moreover, juries may be prone to base plaintiffs' verdicts on in-
adequate evidence. 157 While administrative agencies may have
greater expertise (depending on the agency), in some cases they
also may have a bias toward compensation. 58 Consequently,
such clinical evidence should be subject to searching scrutiny,
and reviewing courts should exercise some degree of caution in
upholding compensation awards. 59
Although MLV theory is not directly applicable to these
cases (given the lack of statistical data), MLV is nevertheless
relevant. The goal still should be to compensate the most
likely victims. Even where quantitative information is not
available, this goal can still be implemented. Among the class
of potential plaintiffs exposed to a hazard, successful plaintiffs
should be those with the relatively strongest claims. Thus, they
should have relatively high exposures and should not exhibit
other risk factors that would tend to explain the disease.
CONCLUSION
The most intriguing of the causation cases involve statisti-
cal proof that the plaintiffs' injuries may be due to the defend-
ant, but at a level of probability well below certainty. For these
cases, previous writers have suggested some form of propor-
tional recovery. Proportional recovery is actually appropriate,
however, only when the risk is uniform across the class of
plaintiffs.
This Article proposes a new approach to cases involving
155. See generally P. MEEHL, PSYCHODIAGNOSIS: SELECTED PAPERS 81-89
(1973) (recommending more rapid development of statistical techniques and
limiting reliance upon clinical judgments); R. NISBEFr & L. Ross, HUMAN IN-
FERENCE: STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT 140-41 (1980)
(arguing that clinical predictions are inferior to those of statistical formulas).
156. See Graham, supra note 76, at 44-47.
157. On the need for jury control, see Dore, supra note 7, at 437-38, 439-40
and sources cited supra note 76. See also Black & Lilienfeld, supra note 7, at
742-43 (Some courts "draw conclusions from information found to be inade-
quate by experts, a rule that leaves little basis for a rational analysis of the
legal sufficiency of evidence.").
158. The workers' compensation cases making awards for cancers suppos-
edly caused by workplace traumas are a dramatic illustration. Agencies have
made many awards clearly inconsistent with scientific knowledge of cancer,
and these awards have generally been upheld by the courts. See Black &
Lilienfeld, supra note 7, at 744-49.
159. For a judge's views on the need for jury control, see Weinstein, supra
note 90, at 1389-90.
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nonuniform risks. When different plaintiffs have different
probabilities of having been injured by the defendant, the MLV
("most likely victim") approach is more appropriate than pro-
portional recovery.160 This approach allocates the total dam-
ages the defendant has caused to a subset of plaintiffs, those
whose injuries were the most likely to have been caused by the
defendant.
Perhaps the most striking characteristic of toxic causation
cases is their diversity. In some, the defendant's responsibility
for the plaintiff's injury is nearly indisputable; in others, de-
fendants may be clearly innocent of causal responsibility.
161
Some cases involve individual plaintiffs who were exposed to
rare chemicals; others involve thousands of plaintiffs and im-
peril the financial stability of entire industries.162 It is the be-
ginning of wisdom to realize that no one approach can do
justice under such diverse circumstances.
160. See supra notes 121-25 and accompanying text.
161. See supra notes 126-36 and accompanying text.
162. See supra note 5.
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APPENDIX
The main purpose of this Appendix is to establish the MLV
results discussed in the text. We begin by setting up the term
to be maximized. Let x, x 2.... XN be the individual awards (all
assumed nonnegative), with associated probabilities of I > p, >
P2 > ... PN.
Def. 1 If xi < 1, let e(xi) = xjp.
If xi > 1, let e(x) = pi - (xi - 1).
Def. 2 E(x) = e(x) + . . . e(xN).
Theorem 1. If1 < x, + ... xN = M < N, thenE(x) has its
maximum value for z1 = 1, ... ZM = 1, ZM+ = 0,
.•ZN = 0 (e.g., zi = 1 unless i > M, in which
case z, = 0).
Lemma 1. 7, <1.
Proof. Suppose zi > 1. Then
E(z) = e(z1 ) + ... e(zi) + ... e(zN) = e(zl) +
... p-(zi-1) + . . . e(zN) < e(zi) + ••. pi +
... e(zN) = e(z) + ... e(z'j) + ... e(zN)
where z'j = 1. Thus, the initial assignment of z,
did not maximize e(z), a contradiction.
Lemma 2. zl = 1.
Proof. By Lemma 1, z, < 1. Suppose z, < 1.
Using Lemma 1 and Defs. 1 and 2, we can write
E(z) = p1z1 + • • • PNZN. Since the sum of the zi
is M > 1, we must have z, > 0 for some i > 1.
Let z'1 = z, + a, z' = zi - a, where a =
nain(i-z, z1). Recall that P, > pi. Then E(z') =
E(z) + pla - pia > E(z), a contradiction.
Proof of Theorem 1.
By induction. Lemma 2 establishes the theorem for N =
1. Suppose the theorem is true for N. We must now prove it
for N + 1.
(a) Suppose M < N. By the induction assumption, we can
maximize e(x) + .•• e(xN-l) with z'. Then set zj = z'j
for i < N, and ZN = 0. This maximizes E(z). (For if ZN
> 0, we must have zj < 1 for some j < N. Then proceed
as in the proof of Lemma 2, setting z* zj + a, Z*N =
ZN - a.)
(b) Suppose M = N. By Lemma 1, we have zi < 1. We also
have z, + . . . ZN = N. Since the zi are by assumption
nonnegative, we must have zj = 1.
We now relax the assumption that M is an integer.
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Theorem 2. If 1 < x 1 + . . . XN = W < N, then E(x) has its
maximum value for z1 = 1, ... Zk = 1, Zk+l = [W), Zk+2 = 0,
... ZN = 0, where K = [w], the largest integer less than W,
and [w) = K-[w].
Sketch of proof: Note that neither lemma used the
assumption that M was an integer, so both still hold. First set
M = [w] and apply Theorem 1 to get a vector of values z-.
Now allocate the remaining fraction, [w]. The first K slots
are all "filled up," and slot K + 1 has the highest p of any
remaining slot. A simple modification of the induction method
of Theorem 1 establishes that this maximizes E(z).
We now add an error term for D along the lines suggested
in the text:
Theorem 3. Let P, + • PN = P.1 63 Let E*(x) = E(x) - h;
whereh= 0if xl +...xN < P, otherwiseh=xi+...xN
- P. Then E*(z) is maximized where the zi are chosen as in
Theorem 2, with w = P.
Proof. Note that z, + • zN = P, and E*(z) = E(z). Let x1,
... XN maximize E*. Lemma 1 still holds,16 so we can
restrict ourselves to xi < 1. Suppose x, + . . . XN > P. E(x)
- E(zl) = pi(x - z1) + • PN(XN - ZN) < P(X 1 + • XN
-P).
So, E*(xi) - E*(z) < Pi(Xi + •••XN - P) - h =(p,
- 1)(xi + . . . XN - P). But Pi < 1, so E*(xi) < E*(z ).
Hence, we must have x, + ... xN < P. Note that P <
N, since 1 > Pi by assumption; so some xj < 1. The
possibility that x, + • • • XN < P can readily be eliminated;
since some xj < 1, we could increase E* if we set xj' = xj +
a, where a = min[1 - xj, P - (xl + . XN)]. Hence, E*(z)
is maximized by setting x + . . . xN = P, which gives h
o. Now we need merely apply Theorem 2.
These theorems have obvious extensions to the more
general cases where the individuals' damages are not all equal
and where some individuals have identical probabilities of
being actual victims.
163. Thus, P is the expected damage done by the defendant.
164. Since E*(z) = E(z) - h, simply subtract h from each line in the proof
of Lemma 1.
We can also make the results more general by changing Definition 1 to
remove the penalty for excessive compensation in the second line of the
definition. Thus, if x, > 1, we would set e(x) = pl. This complicates the proof
of Lemma 1 slightly, but leaves the results substantially unchanged.
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